



DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

**THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION?
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EFFORTS TO MITIGATE
GRAND CORRUPTION IN THE HEALTHCARE AND
MINING SECTORS IN TANZANIA**

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ABSTRACT

The efforts to fight against corruption portrayed by international and domestic actors are crucial in addressing measures to alleviate corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors. Several experts in social science research argue that transparency, public awareness, and oversight are practical approaches to fighting corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors when they receive the needed support from a working legal system and strong political will. This research body has provided information on how transparency, public awareness, and oversight are helpful to fight corruption, but principal-agent theory and collective action theory suggest different ideas of how these approaches can work and why they may not work. This thesis applies these theoretical ideas to understand anti-corruption efforts in two sectors: mining and healthcare. The research study was conducted based on a qualitative approach with specific use of interviews and document analysis as a data-gathering method. The research findings indicate that both mining and healthcare sectors have developed openness through online service provision, an effort to increase corruption risk knowledge to the public, expanded corruption reporting mechanisms, and improved auditing tactics that help detect corruption allegations. The mining sector has recently made progress in fighting corruption due to a good legal framework supported by the implementation of the laws.

In comparison, the healthcare sector has little progress in fighting grand corruption due to rather minor expansion of controlling mechanisms to detect corrupt allegations, such as camera installation in the public medical stores. There is also little control of forgery documents made to the NHIF sheet by health personnel and external medical owners. The findings have implications for improving effective governance to fight corruption in these sectors by informing us that transparency and public awareness have a practical impact on reducing corruption through oversight. Because effective oversight means the ability to audit and suggest punishment to law violators, and it helps to strengthen enforcement of the law.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

AIDS	Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ASA	M/S Alex Stewart (Assayers)
CAG	Controller and Auditor General
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DPP	Director of Public Prosecution
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
ELMIS	Electronic Logistic Management Information System
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
GPSA	Government Procurement Service Agency
KAS	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
LHRC	Legal and Human Rights Centre
MC	Mining Commission

MSD	Medical Store Department
MSSD	Most Similar System Design
NAO	National Audit Office
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NHIF	National Health Insurance Fund
PAC	Public Account Committee
PCCB	Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
PPRA	Public Procurement Regulatory Authority
TANEPs	Tanzania National e-Procurement System
TEITA	Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Act
TEITI	Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
TPDC	Tanzania Petroleum Development Cooperation
TRA	Tanzania Revenue Authority
TV	Television
US	United States
WHO	World Health Organisation

1.1 Introduction

Grand corruption, which involves high ranking government officials, is one of the global challenges (Mashali, 2012). The last decade has seen a convergence between domestic and international policy approaches towards an anti-corruption drive to fight against corrupt crime. The mining and healthcare sectors are among the sectors affected by grand corruption in the mining licence permit issuance, procurement division, and displaying revenue collected to the public. Grand corruption harms poor citizens in a country more than rich ones, increasing inequality and degrading the quality of life (Prasad et al., 2019; Olken 2006; Reinikka & Svwnsson 2004; Gupta et al. 1998; Kohler & Dimancesco,2020). It is also a destructive practice that increasingly affects economic efficiency and growth, distort public service delivery, and lower levels of human development (Hanna et al., 2011; Chene, 2014). However, the worst effect of corruption is increasing mortality rate and violating the existing human right of living, equality to be treated like others, and exploiting human capital contribution to economic

development (Hanna et al., 2011; Chene, 2014; Krambia-Kapardis, 2019). Policies to curb corruption are poorly implemented in developing countries, but it is at times in what way they fall short and why; thus, I intend to examine the policies that attempt to reduce corruption and their degree of success in the context of Tanzania (Krambia-Kapardis, 2019). The study is guided by a broad question that states, “What attempts have been made to reduce corruption in the two sectors, and why do they seem to have succeeded to a greater extent in one context than the other?” I specifically intend to examine study on significant attempts made by Tanzania government to mitigate corruption in the mining and healthcare sector. The study is a comparative structured that looks at attempts to reduce corruption practice in the mining and healthcare sectors on achievement and little successes.

The International anti-corruption regime is a global plan for improving the quality of government, which involves international procedures that include anti-corruption pledges, international treaties, soft laws arrangements, international advocacy campaigns, and political commitments (Lohaus & Gutterman, 2020). The process of implementing these plans engage global actors, domestic actors and non-governmental organisation that works to control bribes and corruption in a range of various contexts (*ibid*).

The global increase of corruption has made international and domestic actors take necessary action to curb it from harming human life in all aspects. One of the major global initiatives introduced to curb corruption is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched in September 2002 as a voluntary tool to increase transparency and alleviate corruption in mineral-rich states (Papyrakis et al., 2017). The EITI specifically focuses on revenue collection obliged for a member state to be paid by the extractive companies operating in the mining sector (*ibid*). It mainly verifies any gap that can emerge as a discrepancy between what the government receives as revenue and a corresponding company payment. Hence, with this exercise, corruption is expected to be limited and reduced (*ibid*). It further compliments that all extractive companies need to disclose their financial information flow and tax liabilities, which should be open to citizens to demand transparency and accountability through the multi-stakeholder platform (*ibid*).

Similarly, the world community engages multi-stakeholders like World Health Organization, Transparency International, national government, development partners, and civil society organisations to combat corruption from harming the healthcare sector (Vian, 2008).

Corruption slows down achieving universal health coverage by impeding people from accessing quality health service delivery (Mackey et al., 2018). The WHO launched the Good Governance for medicine programme in 2004, aiming at preventing corruption through promoting transparency in the pharmaceutical division (Mackey et al., 2018).

International and domestic actors are increasingly applying different measures to curb corruption at different levels of governance. However, in the analysis and results section, I examined how transparency, public awareness and oversight as anti-corruption measures are used to curb corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors. The study also looks at what has been introduced with these measures to reduce corruption? How have these measures worked to reduce corruption? And why have these measures worked differently to reduce corruption in different contexts.

Additionally, the study derives a change from both principal-agent theory and collective action theory to develop a theoretical framework that is then applied to the two cases. The study uses a comparative qualitative case design to examine the measures that worked to reduce corruption and why these measures have succeeded in one context and fail in another. The elite informant interview and document analysis were gathered to examine transparency, public awareness, and oversight in the two sectors. Interviews were conducted with government institutions and NGOs to compare the evidence. The analysis uses a thematic code frame, which summarises the noted similarities and differences at the discussion part for all code frames presented.

The study is organised by presenting previous research on anti-corruption policy measures, the case of Tanzania and the prevalence of corruption in mining and healthcare sectors, the research gap and what we don't know. The next chapter presents principal-agent theory, collective action theory, and how theories expect to bring changes for each theoretical perspective and the theoretical framework. The subsequent section presents, method and design, analysis and results, and conclusion.

1.2 Problem Statement

The corrupt practices in the mining and healthcare sectors have significant effects on government and society by causing massive loss of public money, increase inequalities between poor and rich, corrosion of the quality of service delivery, higher mortality rate and violation of human rights (Prasad et al., 2019; Olken 2006; Kohler & Dimancesco, 2020). Questions about reducing corruption in these sectors in Tanzania are little explored and researched

(Lindner & Banoba, 2014). International and domestic actors are working hard to reduce corruption by instituting measures to prevent and combat it from harming human beings (Diganyeck, 2018). Some of these measures that reduce corruption are transparency, public awareness and oversight (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; Lindner & Banoba, 2014; Shah & Schacter, 2004; Byrne et al., 2010; Avis et al., 2018). The challenges of these measures are how they work to reduce corruption, how they are implemented to combat corruption practices, and why they do not produce desirable results intended in these sectors. This study fulfils the gap by exploring how these efforts have attempted to reduce corruption with varying degrees of success in the mining and healthcare sectors.

1.3 Significance of the study

The study is essential for policymakers, international actors responsible for corruption prevention, domestic NGOs, and government to work wisely to reduce corruption and its effects in these sectors. Mining is the sector endowed with richness of different precious minerals like gold, diamond, copper, tin, tanzanite, and others (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; Diganyeck, 2018). The mining sector is also a sector that contributes to the economy at five per cent and employs citizens and foreigners in Tanzania (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). Due to its lucrativeness and massive availability of these resources in Tanzania, it attracts many small-scale and large-scale investors to invest in this sector with the bad eye of engaging in the corrupt practice in cooperation with government officials (Mashali, 2012).

The healthcare sector is the sector that works on the health and well-being of the human body by providing it with curable services (Evans & Stoddart, 2017). Also, the healthcare sector is the sector that directly touches human life, and it receives greater attention from international and domestic actors by supporting it to protect human healthiness (Parviainen et al., 2019). The sector also faces a challenge of corruption since it is being allocated with a higher budget to protect human well-being (Husmann, 2020). The higher allocation of funds earmarked to healthcare from international Aids and government attract health workers, suppliers and government officials to involve in corrupt practice and essentially distort quality of health service delivery (Husmann, 2020).

I have decided to study these two sectors because policy measures to fight corruption work in both sectors. Most importantly is essential to understand why these measures work well in one sector and not the other sector. The other reason is that some researchers see the two theories

as two distinct and contradictory views of corruption, but there are good reasons to believe that both can help us understand the stability and possibilities to change the prevalence of corruption in these two sectors.

2.0 Previous Literature on policy measures and effectiveness

This section presents the literature review related to the anti-corruption measures and their effort to mitigate corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors. It provides the definition of the critical term corruption, anti-corruption policy, corruption practice in the mining and healthcare sectors, review of the empirical evidence that shows how other scholars have contributed their argument regarding attempts made by anti-corruption policies to mitigate corrupt practices in the healthcare and mining contexts.

2.1.1 Definition of key terms

2.1.2 Corruption

Corruption can be defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Vian, 2020; Diganyeck, 2018; Kolstad et al., 2008). The practice of giving and receiving bribes in any given situation is regarded as the abuse of power entrusted to any person. However, the practice of corruption may vary depending on the country and context. In general, corruption appears in different forms, including bribery, absenteeism, theft, embezzlement, abuse of discretion, favouritism, exploiting conflict, putting private interest above public interest, and improper political interference (Neupane et al., 2014). Therefore, in this thesis, corruption is distinguished to appear as grand corruption within the healthcare and mining sectors. Grand corruption refers to a type of corruption involving government officials who hold decision-making power on vital policy or contracts (Mashali, 2012). This type of corruption involves a large sum of money and is often played by high-profile government officials or politicians (Mikongoti et al., 2018).

The existing literature bodies point out that corruption in the healthcare sector manifests in absenteeism habits that prevailed in developing countries (Naher et al., 2020). The author posits that absenteeism is made by doctors, lab technicians, and nurses in the form of stealing working hours for being absent from the workplace without leave and doing private practices during working hours (Garcia, 2019, Naher et al., 2020). Absenteeism affects the quality of health service delivery by providing poor health services that lack the needed quality of professional health service in time (Garcia, 2019). The root cause of this problem is the weak regulatory

regime, inadequate law related to health aspects and poor implementation of health-related reforms (Naher et al., 2020).

In contrast to the mining sector, corruption reveals in the form of bribe payment associated with the new mining site opening, which motivates high-rent activities that lead public officials (police, tax collectors and safety regulation inspectors) to request bribes (Knutsen et al., 2017). The opening of a new mining site in the local area increases income generation, business expansion, and labour wages. These factors promote local officials to request bribes from mining holders, local business people, and labourers since it is believed that they have money reaped from the profit generated from the mining extractions (*ibid*).

The argument asserted by Knutsen et al. (2017) seems to reveal in areas where there is weakness in mining reforms, weak democracy, inadequate political commitment and absence of punishment to corrupt doers (*ibid*). The author acknowledges that recently, corruption in the extractive industries has received increasing attention, as evidenced by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative to reduce corruption in the mining sector (*ibid*).

Also, corruption in the healthcare sector manifests through petty corruption. A research work studied by Mndolwa (2018) presents the impacts of petty corruption on health sector performance. The study analysed that petty corruption creates space for favouritism, the persistence of unethical practice, and unfair treatment in the health sector, which undermines the health care sector's performance in providing health services, medical management, and hospital supervision. The author identified that strategies to reduce corruption in the healthcare sector require the government to improve remuneration benefits for medical personnel. And strengthening anti-corruption measures that will enhance watchdog organizations with good laws and regulations will help prevent and fight any form of corruption in the health care sector.

2.1.3 Anti-Corruption

Anti-corruption is the actions taken to prevent, curb, or oppose corruption and mitigate its negative impacts (Vian, 2020). It is a global initiative that involves international actors, transnational actors, regional actors, state actors, and individuals. International agencies have intensively supported organisational and governments to curb corrupt cultural habits worldwide (Halter et al., 2009). In the later section, I will discuss the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) as the leading anti-corruption body in Tanzania, focusing on prevention, combating, investigation, and promoting public awareness on corruption risks.

2.2.4 Attempts made by policy measures to mitigate corruption in healthcare and mining sectors

Existing literature on transparency has been argued by various scholars from two perspectives. One group of researchers say that transparency is a tool that helps to reduce corruption in the mining sector since it propagates more on trust, the openness of information, and publishing the value of mineral extracted and the revenue to be paid to the government (Brusca et al., 2018; Brown & Cloke 2004). Transparency is a crucial tool for releasing useful information for institution evaluation, increasing accountability, and propagating trust among private and public actors (Bauhr & Grimes, 2017; Neupane et al., 2014; Etter, 2012). It is also a tool that can help reduce corruption by making it easy to provide incentives to public officials and help to maintain norms and integrity (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009).

Furthermore, scholars in this group argue that transparency help to engage other stakeholders to counter check and monitor mineral operations and advises solution to what should be done to abolish the differences. Most importantly, it is the advice of strengthening reforms that modify laws and regulations on transparency by making them vital to address the concern identified (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; Diganyeck, 2018; Lindner & Banoba, 2014; Huther & Shah 2000; Etter, 2012). However, the system of government that refers to transparency as an anti-corruption tool manages to control corruption by lowering its practices. Basically, the openness of information helps prevent bribery and fraud because the information produced is placed open to citizens and stakeholders who can counter-check any corruption allegation (Brusca et al., 2018).

Also, transparency helps the government be more efficient, open, productive, responsible, and accountable for providing value-added quality service (Neupane et al., 2014). According to Bauhr and Grimes (2017), the essence of transparency lies in the information shared to be more visible in the sense of being entirely and easily accessible, straightforward, and lead to an accurate conclusion. Having open information that is clearly defined on the operation of government business, being well checked and examining its functions, helps increase trust, reduce corruption, and promote accountability to both actors involved in the industry.

However, transparency is argued to be a vital tool in the mining sector that helps curb corruption and unethical behaviour that harm economic development by losing government revenues (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; Halter et al., 2009). Scholars have pointed out that natural resources'

governance requires institutional, legal, and policy frameworks that consider the issue of transparency and accountability in the management of the mining sector.

Furthermore, the other approach at which transparency help to mitigate corrupt actions in the mining and healthcare sectors is through information and communication technology that focuses on e-government procurement. Information and communication technology are critical in reducing corruption because it focuses on openness, citizen participation, effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability in the government's business operations. Information and communication technology depend on the internet to transfer data with factual and correct information from one point to another (Lupu & Lazar, 2015).

In contrast to the healthcare sector, transparency can help reduce corruption when there are better integration and intervention of accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms to fight corruption based on open contracting and integrity pacts (Kohler & Dimancesco, 2020). The procurement of medical equipment and medicines division in the healthcare sector is prone to corruption impacts that harm healthcare service delivery. Also, transparency operates and works well in this sector when the procurement division applies an e-procurement system that makes the process more honest and accurate (*ibid*).

E-procurement is an electronic procurement that uses information technology such as the internet or a web-based system designed to facilitate the government's acquisition of goods and services or by a private institution (Neupane et al. 2014 in Davila, Gupta & Palmer, 2003). The e-procurement helps facilitate the procurement process, including concrete searching, sourcing, negotiating, ordering, receipt, and post-purchase review (Suleiman, 2015). It plays an essential role in managing the public procurement process, which relies mainly on transparency. Neupane et al. (2014) pointed out that e-procurement assists in standardising and monitoring procurement, increase transparency, reduce personal discretion in purchasing decisions, enhance fair competition among bidders, avoid human interference, and maximise value for money.

The principal-agent modal on e-procurement in the healthcare sector explains the risk of corruption between two parties, such as the principal and agent. The relationship between the principal and the agent appears during the tender administrators and bidders, leading to the emergency of information asymmetry when the agent has more information than the principal (Neupane et al., 2014). In this regard, the information gap occurs due to the incompleteness of

the bidder contract, the problem with the monitoring mechanism and the cost of the contracting process that motivates corruption practice. Also, some of the information agents might hold having contact information, forged documents, colluding companies, and kick-backs to government officials (Kohler and Dimancesco, 2020). Hence, e-procurement is an essential tool that can be used to fight corruption in medicine and medical equipment procurement. This is because e-procurement technology help to work with real-time access to information, automation of procurement process, tracking and monitoring, consistency in procurement, competition among bidders, transparency, efficiency, quality, and accountability in public procurement (Neupane et al., 2014; Jeppesen, 2019).

The other group believes transparency motivates and promotes corruption when accountability is lacking (Bauhr & Grimes 2017). However, transparency may not reduce corruption because when the principal who accesses the information is increasing and may not process and interpret the data, corruption increases (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Therefore, to monitor transparency in reducing corruption, anti-corruption bodies should look carefully at the information produced, which may be a piece of goodness or false information.

These groups of scholars provide an academic understanding of how corruption can be mitigated based on transparency. Thus, in the mining sector, the principal demand information from the agent useful to hold the agent accountable for their actions. The requested information requires adequate transparency to monitor, control, and enable scrutiny by lowering down the information access barrier (Bauhr & Grimes 2017; Persson et al., 2013; Batory, 2012).

A second approach often cited to help fight corruption in both sectors consists of a public awareness campaign that helps raise public consciousness about the corruption issue. Raising awareness on corruption reporting is a critical tool that allows the anti-corruption body to reduce corruption by making it known to the public of all levels. However, communicating messages about corruption risk to an audience is an exceptional power that persuades, compels, and raises inspirational consciousness that influences the audience to take necessary action to prevent corruption (Byrne et al., 2010).

The empirical evidence presented by Byrne et al. (2010) indicated that raising corruption awareness in society requires an effective communication strategy that increases citizens' awareness of their rights to information so they may hold the government accountable. But it

may not work if the government does not institute legal reforms that allow citizens to access government information and hold the government accountable (*ibid*).

Also, the campaign for raising public awareness is being made specifically to disseminate information on the legal mechanism to combat corruption, instructing the public on how to report corruption and raise understanding of the different types of corruption and its risk, how it appears and who involve in it. It further provides knowledge about corrupt behaviour and practices and educates the audience on the root causes, consequences, and potential cures. These pieces of knowledge are crucial to make the public officials and citizens aware of the risks of corruption and engage in combat and prevent it from their workplace (Byrne et al., 2010).

Additionally, rising corruption awareness and reporting are critical approaches that aim to increase understanding of corruption risks to actors involved in service provisions. The advocated campaign on corruption knowledge helps provide a preventive mechanism for reporting the corrupt allegation, refusing to pay a bribe for exchange of services, and preventing a politician from getting involved in bad habits of corruption (Doig & Riley, 1998).

How are these campaigns being disseminated within society? A literature work portrayed by Byrne et al. (2010) argues that for anti-corruption bodies to educate the public on the risk of grand corruption need support from the media platform at which the message should be air and publishing to reach the audience. In this case, the standard method to present the message to the community is through radios airs, seminars, workshops, communities meeting, and presenting at national and periodic exhibitions (*ibid*).

On the other hand, raising awareness and reporting corruption allegations works better in countries that follow the rule of law (Shah & Schacter, 2004). This is because educating public officials about corruptions risk is the governance concern that requires broader effort to widespread the knowledge into the community perceived corruption as a cultural norm. In this regard, to support anti-corruption agencies in raising public awareness campaigns is likely to meet with limited success in an environment where corruption is rampant and the governance environment is deeply flawed (*ibid*). The authors arrived at this argument from the incidence of corruption modal, which presented those countries with high corruption have a low quality of governance, those with medium corruption have fair governance, and those with low corruption have good governance (*ibid*).

In an environment where governance is weak, an anti-corruption effort on public awareness is prone to be misused as a tool of political victimisation (*ibid*). The political intervention affects technical campaigns to advocate raising corruption awareness due to little budget allocation and stealing the funds planned for the activity. However, both existing research and experience related to public sector corruption for raising public awareness suggest that corruption is widespread, anti-corruption programs must begin with a serious effort to address the dysfunctional governance environment that nurtures corruption (*ibid*).

The rise of public awareness campaigns manifests in both sectors in terms of similarities in which campaigns are provided to public officials (resident mines and health personnel) and investors on the general ground of the sources, impacts and ways to fight corruption. Differences appear in campaign raising when trainers educate public officials through seminars and workshops in the mining or healthcare sector (PCCB, 2019). The campaigns educate society on ways to fight corruption by sharing knowledge to refuse to give and receiving corruption and reporting any corruption allegations (*ibid*).

The other attempt to reduce corruption is oversight institutions through financial audit and control, investigations, public account committee, media and civil society. The recently existing literature body considers financial audit as an independent watchdog institution that works on public interest, focusing on government transparency and accountability (Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998). However, auditing promotes transparency and accountability within government institutions to deliver services to the community. Vian (2020) pointed out an empirical finding that audits help to reveal specific financial losses to corruption. This helps reduce the disappearance of enormous money lost due to corrupt tendencies prevalent within government organisations. It also helps identify and assess risk areas prone to corrupt practice and reveal corruption scandals (Bozek & Emerling, 2016).

In the contemporarily existing literature body, researchers indicate that audits play two critical roles in the fight against corruption. These roles are prevention and detecting corruption; there will be less to detect if auditors prevent corruption. However, professional auditors suggest dealing with the prevention, which reduces corruption at a great extent although seeing it help auditors to initiate measure to prevent it (Jeppesen, 2019; Borge, 1999).

Jeppesen (2019) pointed out that financial audits may detect corruption through kick-back schemes that rely on overspending, which may be detected through analytical procedures such

as benchmarking. Also, inspections on the tender process, including price quoted actual price, and checks on violations of law that govern daily business activities help detect corrupt procurement division practices. Other techniques that might help detect corruption through auditing are undercover agents, auditor's observation ability, and information from the press which suspected the presence of corruption trends.

Additionally, to prevent corruption, auditors work to identify areas prone to corruption and provide recommendations for quick reform that could introduce strong regulations or laws to prevent it (Jeppesen, 2019). Also, auditors may prevent corruption by reminding employees to follow and understand organisation policies governing the organisation's general operations. And that if any employee breaches any policy is then entitled to be sanctioned or relieved from duty. Furthermore, internal auditing control plays a vital role in preventing corruption by controlling proper documentation phases during the purchase of goods from the vendors. This happens by informing vendors to sign anti-corruption papers, which is a strong term for them not to engage in corrupt practices (Jeppesen, 2019).

Regarding the above points, several researchers find that auditing is a vital oversight mechanism that helps detect corruption, report the audited findings, and provide recommendations for sanction for those involved in unethical behaviour of corruption. Liu and Lin (2012) in Schelker & Eichenberger (2010), Blume & Voigt (2011) argues that auditing improves the transparency of public policy and reduce wasteful spending. For example, Olken (2007) conducted a field experiment on the monitoring effect of government auditing in Indonesia and concluded that when the village road projects being audited by the government increased from 4% to 100%, corruption (over-spending) on these projects decreased by 8% (Liu & Lin, 2012). Finally, auditing is an essential investigative process that needs to be tied up with authority to impose administrative sanctions and penalties once it detects corruption in public organisations (*ibid*).

The other factor that adds value to oversight is that the parliamentary public account committee mitigates corruption through its fundamental oversight role that promotes transparency and accountability of government officials and private officials who operate in private companies. Existing literature on PAC argues that PAC can curb corruption by holding the government accountable through the budgetary process and exercising parliamentary oversight in cooperation with audit institutions (Stapenhurst et al., 2006). It is noted that PAC control

corruption by involving officials with interviews and investigating whether policies and laws in public institutions are being abided by and followed by both private and public officials (*ibid*).

Also, a camera surveillance installation aim at enhancing the security of what is happening in the healthcare sector (Norman et al., 2020). The camera act as a monitoring and investigative tool that act mostly as a deterrent factor; in other words, the simple fact of knowing that there is a camera may lead to people behaving better and stop stealing medicines (*ibid*).

Furthermore, civil society organisations and media are essential watchdog tools that help to reveal any corruption practice being made in public and private institutions. There has been an increasing realisation that improving information disclosure and giving citizens greater right to decision can effectively reduce corruption. For example, Liu and Lin (2012) pointed out that when the central government in Uganda started publishing in a newspaper on the accounts of the education funds allocated to primary school, the local capture of education funds has reduced significantly, and student enrolment and learning have improved considerably. Hence, researchers argued that media are a valuable incentive that enforces corruption reduction. Newspapers, television, and radios are significant in publishing corruption to the electorate and empowering the community to punish corrupt bureaucrats. (Hanna et al., 2011; Mikongoti, et al., 2016).

The recently available research on how media help reduces corruption is analysed in work portrayed by Byrne et al. (2010). The authors argue that media journalists investigate corruption allegations based on revealing wrongdoing and creating scandals. They achieve this mission through undercover journalist investigation, questioning and interviewing respondents on corruption allegations. However, media may be reflected in under or over-reporting incidents of corruption (*ibid*). The quality of news includes bias, inaccuracy, and sensational to the reader or viewer, requiring careful reliability to produce an amount of confirmed information to the public (*ibid*).

3.0 The case of Tanzania

3.1. History and reason for anti-corruption formation.

The formation of the anti-corruption body in Tanzania was highly influenced by the widespread corruption in the country at different levels. Its formation is dated back to 1966 when the government worried about the abuse of power done by government officials by engaging in

corrupt practices (Afro barometer, 2006). The government established the permanent commission of inquiry (Ombudsman) to check on the abuse of power. In complimenting the commission's work, in 1971, the government passed the Prevention of Corruption Act, leading to the formation of the Ant-Corruption Squad in 1975. However, in 2001, the permanent commission of inquiry was transformed to the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRGG) through the parliament Act (*ibid*).

As corruption was still prevalent three decades back, the government made an effort to strengthen the Anti-Corruption Squad by transforming it into the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) in 2007, which addresses the fight against corruption practice at the specific base of prevention, investigation, promote public awareness on corruption issues through public education, as well as implementing anti-corruption Act at all level of government and private entities (Afro barometer 2006).

During the president Mkapa administration in 1996, the president appointed the presidential commission Against corruption to assess the state of corruption in the country and formulate the recommendations. The commission produced the Warioba Report, which adopted a comprehensive National Ant-Corruption Strategy and Action plan (NACSAP) (Lindner & Banoba, 2014). The Warioba Anti-corruption Commission found that public officials engage in petty corruption to supplement their meagre income. In contrast, senior government officials engage in grand corruption to satisfy their excessive greed to accumulate wealth for their private gain. However, the report recommended establishing the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) in Tanzania as the national instrument that alleviates corruption (Mikongoti et al.,2016).

The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) is established under the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act No 11. Of 2007. This Act was enacted after the repeal of the Prevention and Combating Act, chapter 329 revised in 2002. The establishment of this body comes after the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania passed the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bill on April 16, 2007. The Bill was signed by the president Mr Jakaya Kikwete and became the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act No 11. Of 2007 which come into effect on July 2007.¹

¹ <https://www.pccb.go.tz/index.php/en/kuhusu-sisi/historia-ya-takukuru>

The primary purpose of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act No. 11 of 2007 is set out in sections 4 and 7 of the Act to ensure good governance and eliminate corruption in the country. To ensure that this goal is met, this law creates a better legal administrative and operational environment focusing on prevention and combat corruption (PCCB Act No 11., 2007; Sikoi, 2013).

3.2 Corruption practice in the mining

According to Diganyeck L. (2018), an allegation of corrupt practice in the mining sector was caused by the lack of transparency in mining contracts between the government and companies that are often suspected of favouring certain companies involved in mineral extraction in Tanzania. Also, government officials working in the mining sector engaged in corrupt practices when conducting mining operations, including permit issues (*ibid*). Additionally, tax officials who assessed tax in mining involved in unethical practice led to huge revenue loss to the government(*ibid*). Several assessments were carried out on tax payments made to the government without having a mechanism to watch out for how the amount earned was paid to the government (*ibid*).

However, public officials working in the division of minerals from the Ministry of Energy are alleged to involve in corruption because of a conflict of interest by owning mineral rights. For example, the government awarded an improper tender to ASA due to a conflict of interest. The Minister of Finance and Minister of Minerals were charged with abuse of their position by arbitrary procuring. The ex-Minister of Finance was charged to exempt ASA from paying taxes worth \$ 9.32 million (Diganyeck, 2018). Moreover, before the strength of mining laws in 2017, corruption in the mining sector led the country to lose from gaining revenue (*ibid*).

Research studies portrayed by Poncian & Kigodi (2018) presented a question on how transparency initiatives have impacted governance and accountability in Tanzania's extractive sector. The study analysed that the government of Tanzania has improved and strengthened anti-corruption measures to fight against corrupt practices. The unethical practice of corruption prevailing in the mining sector due to flawed policies, weak governance, dishonesty of public officials, and tax evasion made by mining companies in cooperation with dishonest government officials (*ibid*). The government improved anti-corruption measures by designing new Acts and renewing existing Acts governing the extractive sector. The law reform has resulted in an increase in transparency and accountability in mining operation activities. Also, it has improved

the provision of information and report openly, which allowed civil society and parliament to oversee the trend of the mining operation and push the government on necessary changes that need attention and action at hand (*ibid*).

Additionally, studies demonstrated by Lindner & Banoba (2014) pointed out an overview of corruption and anti-corruption effort made by the Tanzania government to curb corrupt practices in the extractive industry. The author contended that in the mining sector, the state regulatory capacity is undermined by rent-seeking, theft by state functionaries, and involvement of top officials in rent-seeking. However, mining development operations were associated with government officials' lack of transparency and accountability, which resulted in increased corrupt practices that resulted in the loss of government revenue. In curbing corruption challenges in the mining sector, the government adopted the initiatives advised by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by designing and tightening regulation of the extractive industries in Tanzania that benefit the public (*ibid*). Through this initiative, the government improved transparency and accountability and strengthened anti-corruption strategies to fight corruption activities in the mining sector (Poncian & Kigodi 2018).

In a comparison study assessing corruption and anti-corruption strategies, the research work presented by Doig and Riley (1998) identified that corruption in Tanzania was associated with the inadequate political will to give the Bureau strength to act and the decline in public ethics in Tanzania (*ibid*). They further contended that corruption was dominated by clientelist links between business people and decision-makers, particularly politicians. However, corruption was rampant in the mining sector in grand corruption, which deteriorated the mining operation and caused the government to lose revenue. Concerning the anti-corruption strategies that can help curb the rampant corrupt practice that prevailed in this sector, the authors identified that systems like public education on the effect of corruption, prevention, and reporting the complaints were adopted to increase public awareness (*ibid*).

Diganyeck (2018) established an argument based on a research question, which spelt out, "Are the laws and regulations on transparency in the mining sector in Tanzania following Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (EITI) standards?" The author identified that the mining sector in Tanzania faced several challenges, including corruption practices that led to the lack of transparency in the extractive contract. The lack of transparency raised suspicion regarding terms agreed between the state and the company. It caused the government to lose revenue due

to other income being diverted to dishonest government officials for their private gain. Also, it increased tax and duties exemption that harm economic development, substantial smuggling activities that certify the origin of Tanzanite minerals to be not of Tanzania origin. In this respect, grand corruption in the mining sector was being practised by top officials with high rank of government position and authority who used to hold a higher level of secrecy in mining operations, contract, and prevention of auditing that could facilitate transparency and accountability. The mining sector had a higher level of grand corruption practice which undermined the economic development in Tanzania (*ibid*).

Furthermore, in curbing corruption in this crucial sector, anti-corruption initiatives were introduced, like forming the prevention and combating corruption Act of 2007. The standard advised by the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives requires the mining operation to be transparent and accountable for government and company officials in their daily mining operations. Moreover, an anti-corruption initiative promoted the creation of the Tanzania Extract Industry and Transparency Act of 2015 in the national laws and regulations that have been given the mandate to regulate transparency in the mining sector (*ibid*).

3.3. Corruption Practice in the Healthcare sector

Studies have been increasingly exploring the quality of public healthcare services in the healthcare sector in Tanzania. The literature review indicates that corruption is one of the significant barriers to providing quality healthcare service in Tanzania (Kabote, 2017). This is because corruption leads to a lack of drugs, equipment, and other medical materials through the theft of drugs and medical equipment (*ibid*). On the other hand, an effort to reduce corruption in the healthcare sector is not impressive because the phenomenon is complicated and challenging in the healthcare sector (*ibid*). However, to mitigate corrupt practices in the healthcare sector, the government is advised to improve the operation of anti-corruption bodies by initiating strong labour laws that will effectively prevent healthcare personnel from not engaging in corrupt practices. Improving remuneration payment to healthcare workers ensures that healthcare workers are responsive and accountable to their professional duties (*ibid*).

Also, the study argument presented by Kohler (2011) indicates that the procurement of public drugs is susceptible to corruption because drugs volumes are large, and contracts are often of immense benefits. However, it motivates some dishonest actors to engage in corrupt actions. The argument contends that tender's specifications may be manipulated to favour one supplier,

and sometimes suppliers may bribe procurement officials to gain an advantage in the tender procurement process (*ibid*). It also occurs in the form of overpayment of products when there is no justifiable healthcare reason. This affects healthcare performance to poor people who might have insufficient funds to pay for healthcare services (*ibid*).

Additionally, the act of stealing, embezzlement and overbilling affect access to needed medicine, equipment, and supplies. For example, in Togo, a government audit discovered that a third of the ant-malaria medicines provided by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, worth over US \$1 million, had been stolen (Hussmann, 2020).

According to research studies conducted by PCCB (2008), the healthcare sector is a tempting target for corruption because it requires significant public funds. Most countries commit 5-15 per cent of their income to the healthcare sector, making it an enticing target for corruption. Abuse can take many forms like unplanned payment to patients, theft of drugs and equipment, and use of the public property for personal benefit. (Van Lerbergh et al, 2002; PCCB, 2008). However, low pay, the lack of a proper system of incentive, desire, demand from customers, steal of medical tools, and the attitude of workers to see that soliciting and accepting bribes is standard practice. These facts lead to employees of the healthcare sector engaging in unethical, corrupt practices (Kamuzora, 2005).

In addition, public education awareness is an anti-corruption approach to increase understanding of corruption effects on patients, suppliers and healthcare personnel. For example, the study conducted at Muhimbili national hospital by PCCB in 2008 was performed using a primary and secondary source of data collection. The research focuses on an interview with 453 healthcare workers respondents and group discussion as the primary source of data collection. In contrast, secondary data was based on a literature review which identified that public healthcare employees are prone to corruption. The research finding detected that pharmacists are alleged to be corrupt at 87.5%, laboratory technicians at 80%, nurses at 65.9%, radiographers at 64.7%, doctors at 59%, and record-keeping at 12.5%.

Also, with the above findings, public awareness is considered as an approach that helps to raise awareness and understanding of corruption risks and their effects on an individual level (Doig & Riley, 1998). The more people get aware of the impact of corrupt practice, the more they prevent, combat, and fight it. Does this approach work to prevent corruption? It has little progress on reducing corruption since there is an increase of reported number corruption

allegations that requires investigation and prosecution to court. And it has helped societies not to engage in corrupt practices due to the raised awareness of the harmful effects of corruption (Doig & Riley, 1998; Reinikka & Svensson, 2002).

However, this approach might not produce the desired outcome of reducing corruption in other contexts due to a lack of honesty between two actors who engage in corruption. As per collective action theory, a corrupt practice that perceives actors' mindset produces dishonest behaviour within actors involved in this dilemma. Hence, honesty required to prevent corruption might not work because honesty is simply not a rational strategy where corruption is considered normal (Persson et al. 1, 2013).

3.4.0 Ant-corruption action taken by Tanzania government to reduce corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors.

3.4.1 Ant-corruption effort in the mining sector

One of the significant anti-corruption efforts made by the Tanzania government to fight corruption in the extractive industries was to adopt the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) standard requirements (Poncian & Kigodi 2018). The standard requirement adopted was to monitor what the extractive companies pay as revenue to the government and confirmation of receipt of revenue by the government from the extractive companies (Diganyeck, 2018). The government decided to reform the law known as Tanzania Extractive Industry Transparency Act in 2015 to work on the gas, oil, and mining sector (*ibid*).

The other action adopted by the Tanzania government was the use of a public awareness campaign that aimed to raise awareness in society about the harmful risk of corruption (Doig & Riley, 1998). The government strengthened the anti-corruption body (PCCB) with the Act of 2007 that repealed the previous anti-corruption squad Act of 1975, which increased efforts to make the public aware of corruption risks at all levels (Lindner & Banoba, 2014; Afro barometer, 2006). The directorate of public education in PCCB initiated measures to educate the public through radio and Tv airing programs, seminars to public officials working in mining sectors, and conducted work ethic oaths to public officials to reduce corruption in this sector (PCCB, 2018). Furthermore, the PCCB investigates suspected corruption incidents and takes them to court for punishment (PCCB, 2020).

Also, Oversight action was adopted to watch and detect corruption trends in the extractive industries by using a parliamentary public account committee. The PAC in Tanzania had the power to investigate the trend of mining operations in Tanzania and advised the government to reform laws that would help corrupt control activities in the mining sector (Stapenhurst et al., 2006). The controller and audit general carried out the power to audit the mining sector before 2010; after the reformation of the mining act of 2010, auditing management was shifted to the Mining Commission (Diganyeck L. (2018).


3.4.2 Ant-corruption effort in the healthcare sector

The government of Tanzania adopted a raising awareness campaign to the community, including health workers, on the negative effect of corruption on the sector (Rahman et al., 2019). The anti-corruption body (PCCB) in corporation with other stakeholders like SIKIKA worked hard to educate health workers and patients, especially pregnant women, on the importance of not engaging in corrupt practice (PCCB, 2008, PCCB 2018; SIKIKA, 2010).

The other initiative adopted in Tanzania to reduce corruption was through transparency in medical procurement, which was analysed to be used in the Public Procurement Act No 7 of 2011. The initiative worked at the infant level of its practicability in Tanzania with little impact to reduce corruption due to policy and legislative framework, institutional structures and information and communication technology challenges (Suleiman, 2015). The WHO enhanced the initiatives to strengthen institutional capacity for the performance of testing drugs at the border and importation site to reduce importation of fake drugs under the ground of corruption (Mamdani et al., 2018).

The history of corruption in Tanzania dates back after independence in 1961, and ant-corruption measure to fight corruption was adopted from 1966 when the government recognised that public officials were corrupt (Afro barometer, 2006). The earlier initiative was to establish the permanent commission of inquiry (Ombudsman) to check on the abuse of power (*ibid*). The government established the permanent commission of inquiry (Ombudsman) to review the abuse of power. The government passed the anti-corruption Act in 1971 to fight corruption in the country at all levels (Lindner & Banoba, 2014).

The below graph presents a cross-time evolution of corruption for Transparency International in Tanzania compared to Kenya and Uganda from 2012 to 2020, in which data were available.



Source: Corruption Perception index 2020

The above graph indicates that in 2020, Tanzania scored 38% out of 100% and ranked 94 out of 180 countries in fighting corruption compared to Uganda and Kenya, where Uganda scored 27% out of 100% and ranked 142 out of 180 countries while Kenya scored 31% out of 100% and ranked 124 out of 180 countries. According to the corruption perception index, Tanzania has made significant progress in fighting corruption at a +3 score change point since 2012 compared to Uganda with a -2 score change point.

3.5 Research gap, Development

There has been inadequate research made to examine the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies in comparative case studies for its efforts to mitigate corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors. Instead, there are separate researches made to reduce corruption in healthcare and mining sectors in different ways, mainly by looking into several anti-corruption bodies, policies, and strategies. This study fills the gap by helping us understand how corruption has been reduced in both sectors by looking at what has been done, how anti-corruption measures worked, and why these measures have not produced desirable results in other contexts.

However, in comparing these two cases, the study provides a learning mechanism of understanding that anti-corruption measures work effectively to control corruption when oversight is left to prevail with solid support from the legal instrument. Also, the comparability of the study provides an understanding of corruption prevailed in both sectors and solutions contributed by the same anti-corruption measures in different mechanisms. Furthermore, other studies focus on mapping policy initiatives and progress, but comparing two sectors provides greater opportunities to understand why similar initiatives can succeed in one sector but fall short in another. The thesis expects to shed light on the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts to reduce corruption in two sectors.

3.6. What we don't know- Research question

The research question in this study is guided by the question that starts on “What attempts have been made to reduce corruption in the two sectors, and why do they seem to have succeeded to a greater extent in one context than the other?”

The mining sector is one of the sectors that contribute to the advancement of economic growth in Tanzania at a level of 5% (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). Although it faced corruption challenges involving dishonest government officials, mining companies were not paying corporate tax, mis invoicing, alleged to have engaged with tax evasion, and inadequate policies and laws implementation used to govern the extractive industry. These challenges fostered the fifth phase government to institute strong anti-corruption measures through Extractive Industry and Transparency Initiatives. Through these action measures, corruption practice in the mining sector has been decreased due to the improvement of transparency, accountability, and strengthening extractive governance by introducing a number of laws, standards, and regulations that govern and control the trend of mining revenue collection, which benefit both government and investors, (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018).

While the healthcare sector is one of the critical sectors that need greater attention in handling its daily operation. The industry faces the corrupt challenge due to vast amounts of resources, information asymmetry, a higher number of international and national actors, and the supply chain system of drugs and medical devices (Hussmann, 2020). There has been an increase in corruption effects in hospital management, in the informal payment for healthcare services, procurement of medical tools and the pharmaceutical chain.

The healthcare sector ranked third with a high incidence of corrupt practices in 2006 and 2014 (Afro Barometer report, 2006; Lindner & Banoba, 2014). Also, Transparency International (2011) ranked the healthcare sector as the third sector with higher corruption practice in Tanzania. The Global Corruption Barometer reflected that the healthcare sector in Tanzania is among the most corrupt sector in the third position after the police 87%, the judiciary 86%, healthcare 79%, civil service 75%, and the education system 74% (Transparent International, 2013).

Therefore, due to the higher level of corruption practice prevailing in the healthcare sector and the low level of action taken to curb it. And the importance for this sector is to touch human beings' lives directly by providing curing, healthcare checks up, improving human well-being and strengthening their healthcare for them to continue working and produce economic stakes for country development. There is an important space to study the effort to reduce corruption in this crucial sector and provide advice and recommendation on what can be done to alleviate corruption from harming this sector. (Transparent International, 2013).

However, in Tanzania, a high level of corruption practice has been widely spread in all aspects of public administration for decades. It has become an experienced feature for the citizen to interact with the state on public goods provision. The country has little progress in implementing anti-corruption efforts against fighting illicit corruption practices. Despite the effort demonstrated by late president Magufuli on renewing anti-corruption efforts, few changes are portrayed to decrease corruption in the country (Camargo & Koechlin, 2018).

4.0 Theories

This study is guided by two theories: The principal-agent theory and the collective action theory. Both approaches help us understand how anti-corruption measures might reduce corruption. In this section, I will start presenting the principal-agent theory by looking at the underlined relationship between the principal and agent to understand whether their relationship helps remove corruption or fail to do so. And lastly, I will discuss the collective action theory looking at the corrupt behaviour perceived by both the principal and agent involved in the business transaction.

4.1 The Principal-Agent Theory

The principal-agent theory helps us to understand how anti-corruption intervention may help to reduce corruption (Kayode et al., 2013). The theory suggests that corruption occurs when

there is tension in organisational relationship raised between the "principal" who demand the service and the "agent" who provide it (Kayode et al., 2013; Ngata, 2016). In the political science literature, the principal-agent theory describes a situation in which a principal requires the service of an agent but lack the information necessary to oversee the performance of the agent effectively, which may motivate the agent to engage in corrupt acts (Carson & Prado 2016). The emphasis point is that the cause of corruption activities relies on the lack of necessary information related to the service demanded by the principal, who could hold the agent accountable for their actions and responsibilities (Bauhr & Grimes 2017).

The theory suggests that a solution to mitigate corruption might possibly be the successful implementation of anti-corruption measures (Persson et al., 2013). The anti-corruption measures based on the principal-agent framework relies on the ability of the principal willing to hold the agent (corrupt officials) accountable for their actions (Persson et al., 2013). The broader willingness for the principal to reduce corruption might work on introducing substantial legal reforms, effective monitoring mechanisms and vigorous punishment (*ibid*). If the principal develops an ability to control information from the agent through either transparency, auditing or awareness-raising, then corruption practice will be lowered.

Also, for this study, the principal is considered to be citizen, investors or government officials who are supposed to be audited by other government offices or companies, while the agent is considered to be companies or public officials working in the mining sector. It can also be vice versa depending on the environment where corruption and services are being done (Persson et al., 2013).

The challenge that might impede the principal-agent relationship not to reduce corruption is inadequate financial resources to fund institutions that work to promote anti-corruption measures to reduce corruption. However, the other challenge might be the weakness of state capacity to regulate policies and enforce them to effectively work to reduce corruption. In other words, the principal may be too weak, unwilling or unable to hold the agent accountable.

4.2 The Collective Action Theory

This is the relevant theory that helps us understand why anti-corruption efforts may not produce the desired result designed to curb corruption. The theory posits that corruption appears and persists when a group of actors act dishonestly, and none of the actors takes on the role of the honest principal, and instead put forward personal interests, and thus engage in corruption. It

further asserts that corruption arises when no explicit and legitimate effective leadership exists to regulate public or common goods (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015).

The theory suggests that in an environment where everyone or a group of actors are believed to engage in corruption, then corruption prevails since the group of actors lack trust. Also, the theory predicts that a group of actors involved in the corrupt act will continue to do so when it is in their individual self-interest (ibid). Hence it encourages corruption to be considered as an experienced and expected behaviour (Persson et al. 2013).

In this regard, there will be no group of actors willing to act honestly in a collective action framework because corruption is perceived as behaviour within the service providers and receivers. The anti-corruption effort will not produce a better result to reduce corruption due to a lack of honest actors to play honestly during service provision (Persson et al., 2013).

Furthermore, the relevant way that might be able to reduce corruption in the context of this theory is applying vital broad-based transparency requirements, greatly increasing monitoring mechanisms, and strengthening sanctions on those engaging in corrupt practices (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; Persson et al. 2013). Such measures might lead actors to feel that other relevant actors will behave honestly, therefore increasing their own willingness to do so.

The greater challenges for this theory rely on the lack of honesty and the decrease of trust rather than the increase played by each group of actors, that is, principal and agent.

The below chapter presents the view of the change in detail, following the policy initiative that shows how changes can appear in the line of collective action theory and principal-agent theory

5.0 How theories expect to bring changes for different policy measures, from each theoretical perspective

The anti-corruption policy regime suggests numerous approaches to reducing corruption. This section discusses a few of the main approaches and spells out their changes from the perspective of principal-agent theory as well as collective action theory. The expected changes to fight corruption is discussed on the policy measures of transparency, public awareness, and oversight institutions from theoretical perspectives.

The principal-agent theory predicts to bring changes when legal frameworks are passed and that there are principals who act on the honest side to monitor the agent and punish the violation of those passed laws and rules (Persson et al., 2013).

Transparency in the mining sector entails the publication of revenue collected from investors to the government in a way that it becomes known to the public. This is effectively done due to a passed law that requires the principal (e.g., TEITI) to monitor the payment from the agent (e.g., extractive companies). When the agent refuses to pay revenue on time, the principal punishes the agent for their action of not paying revenue. In this respect, the principal-agent theory is helpful to reduce corruption through the transparency lens in the mining sector (Persson et al., 2013; Poncian & Kigodi, 2018).

Similarly, in the healthcare sector, transparency can take the form of e-procurement that requires the procurement of health commodities to be open, impartial and without fraud (Neupane et al., 2014). Then, the policy that supervises e-procurement gives the principal's ability (e.g., auditors, CSOs and health team) to monitor the agent (e.g., Pharmacists, hospital directors) on the effective use of the e-procurement system and reduce the probability of engaging in corruption activities.

Collective action theory predicts to reduce corruption when there is an increase of officials who act on the honest side and see other officials have increased trust (Persson et al., 2013). It is considered that honesty is a critical component that helps minimise corruption (Persson et al., 2013). If actors that previously engaged in corruption begin to believe that other actors are beginning to behave in an honest way, then they will be more inclined to behave honestly themselves and reduce corruption. Hence, corrupt behaviour might exhibit more significant changes when all actors are willing to follow rules that emphasise transparency which increases trust among actors involved in service provision and receiving (Persson et al., 2013).

According to the principal-agent theory, public awareness can bring change for reducing corruption when there is a higher level of raising awareness, especially among principals. In this case, the public awareness campaigns talk about the harmful effects of corruption risk and knowledge of reporting mechanisms, which help to raise understanding of how corruption should be reduced (Doig & Riley, 1998; Reinikka & Svensson, 2002). The raised awareness is exercised from the law that governs the prevention of corruption through educating the society, which in turn gives the principal (citizen) the ability to monitor agents (individuals) by

reporting the corrupt allegation to the anti-corruption body. The anti-corruption body works to institute punishment and sanctions to the agent engaged in the corruption act. The centre change is to see more vigilance and reporting from the public and refusal to pay corruption for exchange of service delivery (Byrne et al., 2010).

In addition, collective action theory might possibly seem to bring changes when corruption knowledge about its risks in government trust increases (Persson et al., 2013). A good level of government trust in business operation induces honest behaviour between government and suppliers during the business transaction and service delivery (Persson et al., 2013). However, this attribution might effectively reduce corruption when the relationship between the group of actors (principal and agent) grows to understand corruption risks and start believing that other groups of actors act on the honest side (Persson et al., 2013). It is hard to control the perception of other group of actors on their corruption trend, yet a group that refuses to engage in corrupt behaviour helps to increase honesty in other groups where corruption might expect to be reduced (Doig & Riley, 1998; Reinikka & Svensson, 2002).

The other challenge associated with the collective action theory to bring changes to reduce corruption is a shortage of funds to support training, workshops, and seminars. But also, inadequate human resource to work on raising awareness through education is a problem because they are few of them (Byrne et al., 2010).

With respect to oversight, principal-agent theory expects to reduce corruption when the principal (oversight institutions (including auditing, public account committee, media, and civil society organisations) effectively monitors the agent (public institutions) to detect corruption acts, then corruption diminishes (Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998). The corruption allegation detected due to the effective effort of the principal (auditing and checks) helps produce punishment mechanisms to corrupt practices (Stapenhurst et al., 2006; Liu & Lin, 2012). The punishment mechanism includes removal from work and taken to court (Liu & Lin, 2012). Also, the principal and agent relationship creates a mechanism for both actors to respect laws, follow laws, and strengthen laws that develop mechanisms to remove corruption loopholes within mining and healthcare sectors (Persson et al., 2013).

Furthermore, the increase of oversight institutions that work under strong laws which include a fundamental right to freedom of expression might cause an increased trust between the government and the private sector. However, young democratic states face a challenge of

limited freedom of the press, inadequate laws that propagate on transparency and oversight institutions to be politicised. Therefore, public oversight institutions that work on auditing public and private resources counter checking the utilisation of public monies and publishing corrupt allegations investigated by media journalists and auditors are helpful in reducing corruption when both actors believe each other to act on the honest side (Hanna et al., 2011; Mikongoti et al.,2016).

6. 0 Theoretical and Analytical Framework

The analytical framework of this study is presented to understand attempts to reduce corruption in the healthcare and mining sectors. The framework indicates necessary anti-corruption measures to mitigate corruption in these crucial sectors. In the mining sector, transparency helps to make some mining contract terms open like revenue collection, monitored, and controlled by public oversight institutions, which are public account committees from the parliament and financial auditing. While in the healthcare sector that could use e-procurement to increase transparency and accountability on tendering and procurement processes operate at the infant stage and causing more loss of government funds (Suleiman, 2015).

Also, the other anti-corruption attempt is the use of public awareness propagated in the mining and healthcare sectors. Public awareness helps reduce corruption in both sectors through public education, which raises consciousness and understanding of corruption that enhances reporting corrupt claims to the anti-corruption body. Reporting enables the anti-corruption body to conduct a secret and open investigation and present it to the court for judgement. However, what helps the public awareness work is education given to the community in the mining and healthcare sectors, which increases reporting corrupt claims whenever they detect it. This help to widen and expand investigation on corrupt allegation reported to the anti-corruption body. But it may not work in other circumstances due to corruption practices being perceived as a norm behaviour where honest between two actors is lacking.

Additionally, public oversight institutions have been helping to alleviate corruption in both sectors. It has increased strong initiative to monitor the trend of the mining operation by doing several investigations and provides a recommendation to the government for necessary action that includes renegotiation and sanction of government officials involved in corrupt practices.

The text above outlines how the two theoretical approaches conceptualise the link between different policy approaches, that is, transparency, public awareness and oversight on the

attempt to reduce corruption. The analytical framework below summarises these points and provides a guide for the empirical analyses.

6.1 How theories predict to reduce corruption for Different Policies Initiatives.

Anti-corruption strategies to reduce corruption	Principal-Agent Theory on reducing corruption	Collective Action Theory on reducing corruption	Possible Challenges for two theories not to reduce corruption
Transparency and monitoring <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contract to be open • Revenue and taxes open • E-procurement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Punishment • Sanction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Official see that others are honest • Greater willingness to follow rules 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate of financial resources • Weak enforcement • Weak capacity • Trust decreases rather than increases • Experienced corrupt behaviour
Public Awareness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negative effects of corruption • Knowledge of reporting mechanism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More vigilance and reporting from the public • Refusal to pay bribes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trust in government • Honest in a business transaction between government personnel and suppliers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shortage of Funds • Shortage of human resources • Expensive to conduct training and seminars • Awareness increasing, but reporting does not
Public Oversight institutions. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Auditing public and private resources • Counter checking utilisation of public monies • Publishing corrupt allegations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Punishment • Enforcement of laws • Strengthening of law 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase trust between government and private sectors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limit of freedom of the press • Lack of laws that propagate transparency for media and civil societies • Oversight institutions defunded • Oversight institutions politicised

Note: Compilation of the theories derived by the author

The table above summarises the section that presented theories, theoretical and framework discussion, in which principal-agent theory and collective action theory ascribe different mechanisms to the same policy measures (transparency, public awareness and oversight) on reducing corruption. It also presents possible challenges that can encounter the mentioned

theories not to reduce corruption as expected. However, the table summarises how principal-agent and collective action theories might expect to reduce corruption or fail, presented in section 5.0, which states how theories predict reducing corruption for different policy measures from each theoretical perspective.

7.0 Research Method and Design

The research question in this study spells out that “What attempts have been made to reduce corruption in the two sectors, and why do they seem to have succeeded to a greater extent in one context than the other?” The research question intends to look at the attempt to reduce corruption practice in mining and healthcare sectors in Tanzania and examine the policies that attempt to reduce corruption and understand their degree of success. The study is a comparative that looks at attempts to reduce corruption practice in the mining sector with good achievement and the healthcare sector with little success.

Basically, a case study design takes into consideration in qualitative research setting when the focus of the study is concentrated on answering the question related to "how" and "why" (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin, 2003). It is also used to respond to how and why some social phenomenon event works (Liyambo, 2013; Yin, 2009). A "what" question is asked in the qualitative study to determine an in-depth description, exploration, or explanation of the phenomenon. In the context of this study, a comparative qualitative case design is used to explore the efforts made to combat corruption and why these efforts have succeeded in one context and fail in the other. Basically, the qualitative case design of this study focus on obtaining data through a primary source, that is, the use of elite informant interviews and the secondary source through literature reviews.

The study uses the Most similar System Design (MSSD), which requires a similar variable to be investigated on a similar phenomenon, match their contextual investigated patterns, and arrive at the notable differences (Anckar, 2008). However, the application of MSSD is relevant to explain the contextual factors that play a role to minimize corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors (Gerring, 2006). These factors are transparency, public awareness, and oversight which have been described in the discussion by noting their similarities (matching) and differences. However, comparing two sectors in the same country helps also to account for alternative explanations that could explain differences in a comparison of two countries.

7.1 Data Collection

This study's data collection is based on an elite informant interview, which involves an in-depth interaction conversation between the interviewee and the interviewer. But also, data is collected through documentation basing on the literature review, policy documents, both government and civil society organisations. These two methods, interview and documentation, have been selected out of six sources of evidence for case study research, namely documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical artefacts as identified by Liyambo (2013) in Yin (2009). However, to increase the quality of the study, it is advised to use two or more sources that might be useful for analysis of the evidence collected and link the relationship between the interview questions, data gathered, and research question, Liyambo, (2013) in Yin, (2009).

The interview is a conversation beyond ordinary conversation, and it involves questioning and active listening between an interviewee and interviewer (Kvale, 1995). It further entails straightforward questions requiring regular checking on the knowledge gathered to obtain the intended facts. Hence, this research study uses an open-ended question structure that is formed from semi-structured interviewing. The use of semi-structured interviews guides me to open my mind to the open-ended, designed question and allow the participant to provide information on the attempt to reduce corruption in the healthcare and mining sector (Bryman, 2016; Riach, 2009).

Also, during the interviewing process, I informed the interviewees of the purpose of the study. And I was well prepared to ask an intended question, stay calm while listening actively to the interviewee, and use audio recording for easy data reference and check (Roulston & Choi, 2018).

7.2 Operationalisation of the Variables

7.3 Dependent Variables

The thesis aims to examine the attempts made to reduce corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors and why they seem to have succeeded to a greater extent in one context than the other. The dependent variable is corruption in the form of grand corruption, operationalised from the interviews and document analysis to determine whether corruption has decreased in two sectors. It should be noted that corruption is a broad concept that encompasses different aspects. A few of them are different types of corruption such as petty, grand, bureaucratic, bribery,

absenteeism, theft, embezzlement, abuse of discretion, favouritism, and improper political interference.

7.4 Independent Variable

The independent variables that affect the reduction of corruption in mining and healthcare sectors are transparency, public awareness and oversight, which are all operationalised from the interviews and document analysis to help us understand whether these variables help reduce corruption in these two sectors. Transparency is a broad concept that covers many things as initiatives or policy measures that work to reduce corruption. In this thesis, transparency in the mining sector means accountability, integrity, and openness of information to the public through the publication of reports online and in the media. It also entails online applications for mining licensing permits and reconciliation of reports to be open to citizens and multi-stakeholders. In contrast to the healthcare sector, transparency means putting advertisement of a health service cost on the notice board and on doctor's door, online procurement of health commodities, accountability, integrity and making information open to the public through the publication of reports online and media.

Public awareness in the mining sector means raising awareness campaigns and education on the risk of corruption and its impacts and making it known to the public through the platform of seminars, workshops, radio, social media, and exhibitions. It entails training about the risk of corruption in the sectors to small-scale and large-scale miners and public officials. It further means training health personnel and pregnant women on the risk of corruption and helps to raise awareness for reducing the mortality rate accounted for corruption ground. Contrary to the healthcare sector, public awareness means raising the understanding of corruption knowledge to citizens, health officials and multi-stakeholder actors to raise awareness of corruption risk and its impact on the sector. However, the knowledge of corruption aims to make people aware of the impact of the corruption and take necessary preventive measures from its prevalence in mining and healthcare sectors through reporting corruption allegations and refusing to pay corruption during service provision.

Oversight in this thesis means auditing financial and compliance to detect corruption through observation abilities of auditors, kick-back, benchmarking, informant, interviewing. It also entails the publication of audited reports to the public to read and detect corruption allegations raised by auditors. Auditing in the mining sector means the auditing made by Tanzania

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative to monitor obliged revenue paid to the government and publishing reconciliation report and mining commission that inspects minerals in the ground, produced, and sold per mining site (TEITA Act, 2015; Mining Act, 2010). Auditing in mining sectors involves civil society organisations, parliament and investigative journalist. In contrast to healthcare sector oversight means auditing made by Auditor General, inspection by health team from the ministry of health, regional, and district levels and publish corruption allegation to the public.

The study interpreted results derived from interviews and document analysis through a thematic code framework structured in three questions, what efforts have been introduced, how have these efforts worked, and why have these measures worked differently to reduce corruption in a different context?

7.5 Ethical considerations.

The ethical consideration in a qualitative study is an important aspect that looks at reducing harm to participants (Shaw, 2003). However, the ethical review used in this study is confidentiality, in which interviewees demanded their contributed interviews be treated anonymously (Patton, 2002). However, the study faces possible bias in getting more data from private institutions than from government organisations.

7.6 Limitation of the research study

One of the possible limitations of the study was on how to meet with interviewee participants. Some interviewees did not allow me to meet them face to face due to Covid-19, and we switched to online, which also took a long time to have a meeting. Also, getting data from the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) was not an easy task because PCCB operates more on a secret base than in an open way. The other limitation was on little availability of funds that could accommodate several travels around the country to meet with respondents.

7.7 Sample Selection

The study sample used in this research body was thirteen elite informant interviewees, of which eight were from non-governmental institutions and five from government institutions. Elite informant interviewees from government institutions included the Prevention and Combating

of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) Tanzania-1, Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (TEITI)-1, Mining Commission-2, and Bagamoyo Hospital-1. And elite informant interviewees from private institutions included Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)-1, WAJIBU-2, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)-2, SIKIKA-1, HakiRasilimali-1, and Policy Forum-1. However, I also used literature reviews, journals, books, and reports on the attempts to fight corruption in both sectors.

7.8 Justification of Interview Sample Selected

The interviews selected are from the high level of public and private institutions working on anti-corruption and local NGOs having more information about how anti-corruption measures through PCCB and other institutions work to prevent corruption in Tanzania at different levels. Key informant respondents in the institutions mentioned above work on anti-corruption issues in cooperation with PCCB in preventing corruption in Tanzania (Johnsøn et al. 2016).

Also, the selection of LHRC, WAJIBU, KAS, HakiRasilimali, Policy Forum and SIKIKA have been selected because they are the partner working with PCCB. Their primary role is to mitigate corruption at different levels and have a high level of information about how PCCB work to alleviate corruption in Tanzania. I considered the interviewees as a reliable source of information because they are working as heads of the division of anti-corruption measures in their organisation. The bias that I encountered from government officials was that few of them were likely to give information on positiveness and try to hide the weakness, although the structured interview guide questions managed to explore the reality of the findings.

Document in the analysis part requires data to be examined and interpreted so as to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge necessary to answer the research question (Bowen, 2009). However, the study used documents related to how measures prevent corruption in the analysis part. The used documents for systematic evaluation in the analysis part are from the background paper, working papers, reviews, books, journals, and reports (Bowen, 2009).

8.0 Analysis and Results

The study's research findings are structured according to a thematic code frame that categorises several points to discuss efforts made to mitigate corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors. These points present the findings of the themes in terms of three questions for each

measure in two sectors: what efforts have been introduced, how have these efforts worked, and why have these measures worked differently to reduce corruption in different contexts.

8.1.0 What efforts have been introduced?

8.1.1. Transparency

According to shared experience from informants, this study found that the government of Tanzania use transparency as an anti-corruption measure in the mining sector. This is done by implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) principles and criteria from 2009 when the country joined the initiative looking at how the EITI can reduce corruption in Tanzania. To strengthen transparency and accountability, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), in cooperation with other stakeholders from civil society organisations, advised the government to institute reform by putting the TEITI legal framework, namely Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act (TEITA) of 2015, in the national laws (Lindner & Banoba, 2014; Policy Forum, 2015; Mikongoti et al., 2018; Diganyeck, 2018; Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; PCCB,2019). For example, informants interviewed from government and private NGOs shared the below information regarding TEITI Act.

...Tanzania got its TEITI Act in 2015, which demanded extractive industry operate its activities based on transparency....

...In Tanzania, we got TEIT Act four to five years back, which requires contracts to be open to the public for them to interrogate it.....

According to principal-agent theory, the transparency reform in Tanzania informs us that the principal (TEITI, EITI and Stakeholders) work to monitor the agent (extractive companies) on their corrupt acts (Persson et al., 2013). This is done through Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Act (TEITA) registered law that helps to give the principal ability to access information of the agent (extractive sector) and disrupt their power to engage in corrupt activities (Poncian & Kigodi 2018). It also enables the principal (citizens) to effectively participate and interrogate, reconciling payments made by agents (companies) and those received by the government for further action. Poncian & Kigodi (2018) argued that adopting the TEITA Act of 2015 has enhanced the extractive industry in Tanzania to operate on transparency and accountability. Increased transparency resulted in promoting civic

participation through the reconciliation of payment made by companies to the government and what the government have received from extractive companies (*ibid*).

Additionally, as per an informant from a government institution, the Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative uses transparency to make revenue collected from mining companies openly known to the public. The income collected from mining operating companies is directly paid to the Local Government Authority where the extractive industry operates, Tanzania Revenue Authority, Mining Commission and Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation. The Local Government Authority receives service levy; Mining Commission receives license fees, application fees, and annual rent fees; TRA receives tax paid like corporate tax, withholding tax, and value-added tax. However, TPDC receives taxes related to oil and gas (TEITI, 2021; Poncian & Kigodi, 2018).

.... basically, we prepare a template for the extractive mining sector to fill for what they have paid. This template is also sent to government authority received tax paid by extractive companies. These government authorities include Local government authority, TRA, TPDC and Mining Commission....(Government Representative)

Furthermore, according to the TEITA Act of 2015, TEITI prepares a template form for the extractive industry and government to fill in on what has been paid and received yearly (TEITI, 2021). In order to monitor transparency on its realistic practical, the template filled must be signed and stamped by an internal and external auditor who audited the extractive company or government institution received the funds as a tax paid (*ibid*). Also, openness in revenue collection is revealed more in auditing the revenue collected as being conducted by an independent organization (*ibid*).

....in order for us to be sure that the information filled in the template is correct, we require all entities to submit a signed and stamped templated filled by internal and external auditors in the time specified for submission... (Informant from Government).

The payment of revenue collected from the agent (extractive industry) to the government is interpreted as a significant responsibility for extractive companies to pay the required tax to the government through the push monitored by the principal (TEITI). The transparency mechanism to control corruption in the mining sector portrayed by principals (TEITI) explains that

corruption claims can be detected and reduced through increasing openness in revenue collection.

Moreover, the study found that the mining sector in Tanzania has published a report on the trend of what the government received as tax from extractive companies (TEITI, 2021). The publication of revenue collected is done as a requirement standard advocated by EITI for member states to implement this standard yearly (EITI, 2020). However, the revenue collected reports have been published from July 2008 to June 2019, with eleven reports published (HakiRasilimali, 2020; TEITI, 2021). The published report made by the principal (TEITI) helps to decrease information asymmetry from the agent (extractive companies).

.... Transparency has increased because the TEITI report reveals the exact amount the extractive industries have paid the government. This was not indicated before the transparency reform in 2015.... However, it has made the public know what our government has been paid as the mandatory requirement in the mineral Act of 2010 and that of the Natural Wealth and Resource Contracts (Review and Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017...(NGO Informant)

.....Mining revenue report is published annually and has become increasingly clearly reported as nothing is hidden. Even those areas not included in the report, like small-scale miners, were not available in large quantities. Still, after adopting the changes in the Natural Wealth and Resource Contracts (Review and Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017, all miners are included in the publication report, and it has enhanced them to sell their mining at the established domestic market...(Informant from Government)

Publication of revenue reports to the society made by TEITI through the website page is interpreted as a significant measure to control and monitor corruption in the mining sector. Because any corruption allegation can be traced and detected through publishing a report in which differences are detected and establish the cause ground. However, the established ground can shed light on how corruption has been played within the mining sector. Moreover, the published report helps the principal (society) to understand their specific right as a mandatory obligation to be paid to their respective local area where the mineral extraction is carried out.

In the healthcare sector, the study found that the principal-agent theory uses transparency to control corruption through the centralisation of procuring healthcare commodities online. The Public Procurement Act No 7 of 2011 gives the principal (auditors, CSOs and health team) the ability to control corruption from the agent (Pharmacists) by following the e-procurement guidelines. The guidelines for procuring healthcare commodities (medical tools and drugs) involves a list of requirements from Pharmacists of a healthcare facility to the Medical Store Department (MSD) online. The MSD is a central government medical organization responsible for the distribution of approved medicines and healthcare tools to all public healthcare facilities, which is available in ten zones within Tanzania (Public Procurement Act No 7 of 2011; PCCB Manual in Procurement, 2019; Public Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2016).

...in recent days, it is compulsory for a pharmacist to present healthcare facilities, including medicines and medical tools, to MSD through an online channel, who is the only bidder distributing medicine to all public healthcare facilities..... (Informant from NGOs)

However, Pharmacists present the requirement to Medical Store Department (MSD) through the online system known as Electronic Logistic Management Information System (ELMIS). The system requires a pharmacist to prepare a requirement list online and send it to a regional pharmacist for approval and then to Medical Store Department for supplying the requirement to the applicant (Procurement Regulation 2013; PCCB Manual in Procurement, 2019; Public Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2016). The informants from the government revealed the below experiences.

....In presenting medical requirements to MSD, we use the online system, namely ELMIS, which requires us to present it to the regional pharmacist for approval or recommend any change. It has to be sent to MSD to supply the requested requirement. (Government Representative)

Also, once the presented requirements are not available at the MSD, the MSD sends back the out-of-stock list of medicines to the requested healthcare facility to continue procuring to other suppliers. The procurement process allowed by the Medical Store Department (MSD) to the respective healthcare facility is to be made online through the Tanzania National e-Procurement System (TANEPS) system. However, the procurement process is completed under TANEPS from the procurement division of the healthcare facility, which is also centralized to one supplier who should supply the healthcare commodity requirement as requested (Procurement Regulation 2013).

...in case MSD sends back a list of out of stock, we take the list to the procurement division to procure the medical requirement through TANEPS, which is also centralised to one supplier (Government Respondent).

For example, the bidder responsible for supplying healthcare requirements to the Coast Region has been given the supplying tender for three years. Furthermore, the bidder is obliged to provide the medical necessity with no option of being out of stock (Public Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2016; GPSA establishment order 2007).

The process of centralising procurement of medical tools made by Medical Store Department through an online base, and that of Tanzania National e-Procurement System (TANEPS) to be centralised to one bidder, translates that the principal manages to monitor and control the agent through transparency in medical procurement. Also, the principal plays the role of increasing transparency to be made more open to the public and help remove favouritism that could encourage corruption by the agent. This is similar to the study conducted in Ukraine, which shows that e-procurement that uses the system known as ProZorro increased transparency and built a competitive trust among bidders and increased accountability to officials responsible for it (Kohler & Dimancesco, 2020).

8.1.2 Public Awareness

The research findings from the government and NGO informants for public awareness within the mining sector found that corruption risk awareness has increased among public and private officials working in the extractive industry (PCCB, 2018). The knowledge has been enlarged to understand the negative impact of corruption on their daily activities and life in general. The corruption risks being provided relate to the source of corruption, legal consequences for involving in corrupt behaviour, the importance of reporting corrupt allegations, and bearing witness at the court (PCCB Strategic Plan 2017-2022).

However, awareness has raised in society minds because of an effort to educate people working in this sector through various instituted measures (PCCB, 2018). Actions that have contributed to increasing knowledge of corruption risk to workers are through training, seminars, workshops, online PCCB TV available on YouTube in the name of TAKUKURU TV—aired TV and radio programs three times a week, newsletters and magazines, and corruption prevention clubs in schools and social media (PCCB Strategic Plan 2017-2022).

...one of the essential roles PCCB and TEITI have made is to educate small scale miners and large-scale miners on the impact of corruption through regular training and seminars.... PCCB usually teach and coach them how to report corruption allegation and raise their awareness on the matter (NGO informant).

According to the PCCB Act of 2007, raising awareness in the society on corruption risk is a sustainable educating plan made often by PCCB to the private and public sectors. The format of teaching the community about preventing corruption is through a prepared training road map plan, incorporating civil society organizations like HakiRasilimali, Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung and policy forum to deliver the coaching knowledge to the community (PCCB, 2020). The training involves dialogue sections, questions and answers, dramas, exhibitions, inflatable balloon screen shows, and leaflets and magazines for further self-readings (PCCB, 2019). The awareness-raising aims to increase corruption understanding to the principal (citizens, public officials) to prevent corruption by refusing to pay it, reporting corruption incidences to PCCB for punishment and bear witness at the court (PCCB, 2020).

Additionally, a platform for reporting corruption allegations has been expanded for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) to initiate a PCCB App for android users (PCCB, 2019). The app provides space for a reporter to record audio, video and send messages to PCCB. Also, social media's platform works well on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and individuals because reporters on this platform are responded on time (*ibid*). Furthermore, other existing reporting methods are writing open and secret letters and presenting them to PCCB, free toll number 113, complaint tables, and dropping opinions in the suggestion boxes (PCCB, 2019).

...and the other thing PCCB have made is to expand the reporting platform. In recent days, you can report the recorded corruption allegation on your smartphone in your hand and send it to PCCB directly without being known from a suspected person... (NGO Informant).

The increased knowledge on corruption risk to public and private officials provide us with the understanding that effort to mitigate corruption according to principal-agent theory is contributed with the level of awareness being promoted within the mind of principal and agent (society). The principal (individual with awareness of corruption risk) takes the necessary action to control the agent (individuals who are corrupt) by reporting them to the anti-corruption body for punishment. This is enhanced due to the expanded reporting platform and corruption

knowledge disseminated in the principal's mind. In theory, the more awareness raised, the more decrease in corruption practice, which should go along with implemented punishment (Byrne et al., 2010).

Likewise, the finding in this study noted that awareness of corruption risks in the healthcare sector have also increased to healthcare personnel and suppliers. The corruption risk knowledge is disseminated to health personnel, suppliers, and citizens through seminars, workshops, and training on the matter and pregnant women during clinic visits (PCCB, 2018; PCCB, 2019). Still, more importantly, within the healthcare sector, there are stickers on doctors' doors written no corruption and, on the advertisement board, there is information placed there showing no corruption at this premises (Persson et al. 2013; PCCB, 2019).

... also, PCCB, in cooperation with CSO, have managed to train healthcare personnel and pregnant women on the issue of ethics at the workplace, risk of corruption and emphasises the importance of removing corruption at the workplace...(Government informant)

Additionally, the reporting mechanism is done through secret informants who work in secret to detect any corruption allegation harming the sector and report to the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) directly for investigation. Furthermore, the increased corruption knowledge within the healthcare sector has influenced hospital management to announce often all medicines and prices available on the advertisement board (PCCB Strategic Plan 2017-2022).

.... apart from using toll-free call number 113, sending short messages, social media and the PCCB App...PCCB has expanded reporting of corruption allegations through informants who report corruption claims on secret bases and are unknown to ordinary people... (Informant Government).

Awareness-raising made in the healthcare sector through secret informants, and regular seminars and training to healthcare personnel can be translated as an excellent method to emphasise ethics and discipline at the workplace. According to principal-agent theory, awareness-raising contributes to the increase of transparency for service provision to the principal (citizen) who control the agent (health personnel) on corruption trend. This is because the listing of received medicine prices on the advertisement board gives the principal the opportunity to understand services to be served and control the agent from engaging in

corruption acts. It is also a significant sign of increasing transparency in medicine management to the principal (public) (Shah & Schacter, 2004).

8.1.3 Oversight

The study noted that oversight in the mining sector is conducted by the principal (TEITI), who are responsible for counter-checking the amount paid as a tax by the agent (extractive companies) and what the government has received (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). Auditing made by Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (TEITI) is done once per year, and when it notices a considerable difference in their reconciliation report, the principal (TEITI) requests the Controller and Auditor General to conduct a special audit to establish a ground cause of the differences to monitor the corrupt trend of the agent. However, as per the Natural Wealth and Resource Contracts (Review and Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017 and Mining Act of 2010, Mining Commission (MC) has also the power to conduct general auditing of mining operations in Tanzania. Also, auditing made by the principal (Mining Commission) inspects a balance of minerals that remained in the ground, mineral produced, and minerals sold per each mining site (TEITA Act, 2015; Mining Act, 2010).

...often, an audit is made by TEITI to counter check what extractive companies have paid as a tax and what the government have received from extractive companies.... Also, Mining Commission has been given power by the Natural Wealth and Resource Contracts (Review and Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017, and the Mining Act of 2010 to conduct auditing in the mining site by inspecting minerals in-ground, minerals produced and minerals are taken to the market for sale... (NGO Informant).

Additionally, minerals auditing is often carried out by investigators from the mining commission. The reform made by Natural Wealth and Resource Contracts (Review and Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017 have helped to increase auditing budget, made easier for a resource available like working allowance, vehicles, fuels, and auditing garments. However, auditing reports are published on Ministry of Minerals and Mining commission websites. People can access and get the awareness of what has been produced, sold, and remained in the ground (Mining Act 2010).

Therefore, auditing conducted by the principal (TEITI and MC) explains how the principal control agent (extractive companies) in reducing corruption in the mining sector. The monitoring mechanism is fundamentally aligned with legal reforms, practical implementation of the laws and accountability for public and private officials. Hence, it makes it easier for detected corrupt claims to be revealed as several investigations are being made and published to the community for interrogation and institute punishment for agents who violate those laws by being involved in corrupt behaviour (Diganyeck, 2018).

In the healthcare sector, findings have revealed that oversight is being conducted by the principal (Controller and Auditor General (CAG)), who investigate financial audits and compliance audits of the agent (healthcare facility). Also, the healthcare sector is being examined by healthcare personnel who counter-check healthcare activities' operations to all public and private healthcare facilities. The audited report published in the healthcare sector sheds light for the principal (CSO, journalists, media, and Parliament Social Services and Community Development Committee) to conduct watchdog investigations on the corruption matter portrayed by the agent (pharmacists) and provide recommendations. The CAG report does indicate public financial expenditure and detects corruption allegations that caused the loss of public money. Additionally, the audited CAG report is published on the CAG website and be open to everyone to access (Pelizzo & Kinyondo, 2014).

...investigation in the healthcare sector is made by CAG and is a priority to be investigated... however, healthcare policies provide opportunity space for CSO to cooperate with the government in monitoring healthcare facilities...(NGO Informant).

...In Tanzania, auditing is a good monitoring tool that helps to detect corruption, but the challenges are that most CAG recommendations are not taken into grave account to be implemented... (NGO Informant).

Furthermore, the CAG conducted an investigation on the National Healthcare Insurance Funds (NHIF) responsible for healthcare insurance in Tanzania. According to the collective action theory, the group of actors, CAG, act on the honest side by revealing corrupt acts made by the health personnel and medical store owner actor through auditing. The audited report does indicate the loss of a lot of money made by agents (healthcare personnel in collaboration with medical store owners). It is found that medical personnel write a forgery and an overpayment bill on the NHIF sheet at which a patient presents to the medical store for a collection of

medicines. For example, the special audit made in July 2021 for NHIF transactions in the Kilimanjaro region detected that Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre and Mawenzi hospitals are alleged to involve in corrupt practices². The allegation involved the forgery of losing TZS 520 million, at which responsible investigation bodies are working on this case and will institute substantial measures, including taking them to court³. The other example is that the CAG report for the financial year 2018/2019 indicates that TZS 1.4 billion NHIF claims were rejected as subjected to corruption from 19 referral hospitals (CAG Report 2018/2019, 2020).

In general, the auditing made by CAG translates to us that the principal (CAG) is an important monitoring tool to control the utilization of public funds with compliance with laws. However, it is not easy to reduce corruption while other groups of actors act on the dishonest side and believe that the other group is also corrupt. However, the group of actors (CAG) who act on the honest side can monitor agents by abiding and following the laws, which can help prevent corruption from harming the healthcare sector. However, due to the ineffective implementation of CAG recommendations, corruption remains a distorting practice in this sector, requiring treatment by effectively working on CAG (principal) punishments (Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998).

8.2.0 How have these efforts worked to reduce corruption in the Mining and Healthcare sector?

8.2.1 Transparency

The study found that transparency in the mining sector has reduced corruption by making reconciliation reports open to the public. The transparency reform that resulted in obtaining the TEITA Act in 2015 has significantly pushed for the growth of transparency management in the mining sector by increasing report publication and controlling government funds' loss. For example, from 2009 to 2019, TEITI has published 11 reports showing growth of the mining sector, the amount the government gained as revenue collection, and differences in revenue collection.

...also, TEITI is working well to control corruption; nowadays, there are about 11 reports published showing revenue collected by the government to the public this report has helped to put things open. It is difficult for the extractive company to bribe executive directors at the

² <https://www.jamiiforums.com/threads/waziri-abaini-upigaji-milioni-520-za-nhif-mkoani-kilimanjaro.1889872/>

³ <https://www.ippmedia.com/sw/habari/waziri-abaini-upigaji-milioni-520-za-nhif>

local government not to demand corporate social responsibility packages made every year. If they do so, the report will put them open... (NGO Informant).

Additionally, there is good governance of controlling transparency in mining operations made by the principal (TEITI and MC). TEITI does make a deep follow up on what revenue is paid by the extractive industry by sending them a template that should be filled in a specified time (TEITA Act, 2015). TEITI employs an independent company to conduct a review and reconciliation assignment to make transparency more realistic. This activity is undertaken in comparative confirmation on between what the agent (company) paid and what the government received. In this regard, there is a relative achievement of the principal to control the agent in the principal-agent modal on what the company (agent) paid and what the government received. For example, in the year covering 2017 to 2018, a total of 31 mining companies paid a revenue of worth of Tzs 732.3 billion to the government, and the government confirmed to have received Tzs 728.9 billion. This indicated a discrepancy of 3.4 TZS billion, which is under reconciliation. However, this achievement is well improved compared to 2008/2009, which had a difference of \$37 million (Johnsøn, 2012; TEITI Act, 2015; Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; TEITI report, 2020).

However, transparency in the mining Commission (MC) has been strengthened by conducting effective follow up by ensuring extractive companies pay what is obliged to pay according to the laws. Also, the principal (Mining Commission) works to simplify the application for a license online through the mining cadastre portal, at which the applicant receives a response within 14 days from the day application is made.

...now, the mining commission has developed a mining cadastre portal that has simplified applications to be made online in an open way... the outlet has helped reduce corruption, simplify application time, and reduce complaints on licence applications....(Informant from Government).

Generally, it can be translated that transparency helps to reduce corruption when there is an exemplary implementation of legal reforms made by principals (TEITI and MC), adequate follow-up, willingness to follow the rules by the agent (mining companies) and community participation in mining operations. However, making revenue collection open to the public, increasing the publication of revenue reports, and regular inspections of mining operations have

significantly helped the growth of transparency in a mining operation in Tanzania. This growth has also managed to help in reducing corruption (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018)

Likewise, transparency has been seen to reduce corruption in the procurement of healthcare commodities to be online rather than on paper. The procurement is centralised to MSD as the sole distributor of healthcare commodities to all public healthcare facilities through ELMIS and to one bidder approved in a regional wise to supply medicines to all public healthcare facilities in the region through TANEPS. Also, upon receiving requested healthcare commodities like medicines, the principal (internal management team) confirms the tally upon safe receipt of the consignment per the ordered list against the received list made by the agent (pharmacist).

....in reality, the healthcare sector has improved mechanisms to control corruption...we see recently, procurement of medicines is done online to either MSD or a single supplier...this makes it easy for suppliers and healthcare officers not to be involved; in corruption, because they do no longer meet anywhere...(NGO Informant).

In addition, as per informants from NGOs, there is an increase of transparency made through placing a list of medicine prices received and the cost for each healthcare service on the hospital advertisement board. Putting these services on the advertisement board aims to reduce corruption and raise awareness of the public's actual price per medicine and service.

...when you go to the hospital, you will realize that prices for medicines and healthcare services are listed on the advertisement board... this has increased transparency which automatically reduces corruption...(NGO Informant).

Apart from this effort to reduce corruption in the healthcare sector through transparency, there are still corrupt problems where a group of pharmacists (agent/ actor) act on dishonest sides and steal medicine in the medical store⁴. Also, the other problem is that healthcare personnel (agents) behave dishonestly while believing other groups of actors (external medical store owners) also act on the dishonest side. Existing evidence suggests that corrupt health personnel collude with each other to forge bills to extract overpayment costs on NHIF documents and gain a lot of corrupt money⁵.

⁴ <https://www.jamiiforums.com/threads/watumishi-23-moi-wachunguzwa-madai-ya-wizi-wa-dawa-na-vifaa-tiba.1828136/>

⁵ <https://www.ipppmedia.com/sw/habari/waziri-abaini-upigaji-milioni-520-za-nhif>

Therefore, it can be translated that e-procurement help to improve transparency in procurement of healthcare commodities and automatically control corruption by distancing supplier and healthcare personnel. But in other way, it fails to control corruption perceived as expected behaviour within group of actors in the healthcare sector.

8.2.2 Public Awareness

The study results noted that awareness-raising on corruption risks has increased to public and private officials in the mining sector. There is a relative decrease in reporting grand corruption allegations to PCCB influenced by awareness of the corrupt knowledge to the agent (investor). For example, in 2018/2019, a total number of 911 corruption allegation cases were reported and presented to the court for punishment, of which seven were cases of grand corruption, while in the year 2016/2017, the total number of 575 corruption allegations cases were reported and submitted to the court for punishment in which 16 were cases of grand corruption (PCCB, 2020).

...there is also an increase of corruption reports made through the PCCB App from various reporters who have become aware of corruption risk and report the incidences immediately once they suspect it... (Informant from Government).

Also, the reduction in reporting is caused by the strengthening of legal reforms, several ethics seminars, training, workshops, and exhibition that has raised the understanding of rights and responsibilities to the agent (investor) (PCCB, 2019). For example, in the mining sector, corruption complaints in the license division have decreased because public officials (principal) and investors (agent) follow the rules and regulations. However, strengthening license applications to be online and a response to be made in no more than two weeks have influenced the reduction of corruption claims (PCCB 2018, PCCB 2019, PCCB, 2020).

...and we see people and investors understand a lot on corruption risks, Because investors often ask what should they do for them not to involve in any mistakes including corrupt practice. We do tell them to follow the rules and regulations... but it has dramatically reduced corruption because legal reforms are followed by public and private officials...(Informant from the Government).

Therefore, the growth of legal reforms, expansion of reporting mechanisms and increased awareness of corruption to the principal (citizen) has helped to punish the agent (corrupt

individuals) by reporting and taking them to court. The multiple efforts made through training and seminars to impact corrupt awareness of the community in the mining sector suggests that raising awareness is crucial sustainability of the process that help principals to become aware of corruption matters and take action to reduce corruption. Also, the awareness raised help to promote faithfulness and report corrupt claims to the respective anti-corruption body for punishment.

Consequently, in the healthcare sector, the study found that awareness-raising have inadequately managed to reduce corruption because medicines in the healthcare facilities and MSD stores are stolen (Mamdani et al., 2018; CAG Report 2018/2019, 2020). For example, the CAG report in 2019/2020 noted the robbery loss of healthcare commodities worth Tzs 11.9 million (CAG Report 2019/2020, 2021).

In general, it can be discussed that transparency in the healthcare sector has somehow improved to control grand corruption due to the use of online e-procurement. But it has not improved the mechanism to handle it because healthcare officials who act on the dishonest side are in collective action dilemma (Persson et al. 2013).

8.2.3 Oversight

The findings in this research observed that oversight conducted by auditors help to reduce corruption in the mining sector by doing several mining inspections done by the mining commission (Agent) (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). According to the Mining Act of 2010, MC conducts regular mining operation assessments by involving a team of inspectors from the mining commission, ministry of defence, attorney general, treasury, land management, and local government authority. The inspection is carried out on a work plan and implementation of law in an open way. However, there are often changes of professionals who go to inspect the operation of mining to not engage in corrupt activities.

....and the good news in these days is that audit is very transparency because to avoid corruption, the audit team is secretly made to appoint members from local government, treasury, security and safety institution, and mining commission, and decisions are decided by the whole team transparently and who at the end of the task sign the agreement sheet for implementation... (Informant from Government).

Additionally, inspections made look on environment management, implementation of local content, number of minerals produced and number of minerals sold. Also, in every mining site, mining resident officers work day and night to supervise mining operations from production, smelting, and despatch for sale (Mining Act of 2010).

The presence of professionals (principals) from different institutions who are secretly appointed to cooperate with the MC in inspecting mining operations can be translated that mining laws and regulations give ability the principal to control agents (investors) from engaging in corrupt acts. However, following the rules and laws that guide mining operation by conducting several audits in a transparency way help to reduce corruption loopholes.

In the healthcare sector, mechanisms to control corruption have reduced corruption by conducting several medical store inspections. The integrated measure made in the healthcare sector intervene in the tracking of the received healthcare commodities and distribution produced from the healthcare facility store to the pharmacy. However, healthcare commodities inspection is regularly conducted at local government authority, regional authority, Ministry level and CAG.

...there is a committee team from the hospital management that conduct regular inspections of healthcare commodities and the intervention from the regional level, ministry level and CAG who often come to audit the trend of medicine and other medical tools...(NGO Informant).

Therefore, the mechanism to control corruption in the healthcare sector by inspecting healthcare commodities by involving different levels of healthcare management can be translated as a significant effort to reduce corruption. Also, it might need more effort to monitor the trend of medical stores since available medical in-store at public healthcare facilities and MSD premises are being stolen at the ground of health officials (agent) who act on the dishonest side.

8.3.0 why have these measures worked differently to reduce corruption in different contexts?

As the discussion above shows, anti-corruption measures have had a greater impact in the mining sector than in healthcare. This section seeks to understand the main challenges in anti-corruption work in the healthcare sector.

8.3.1 Transparency

The study noted that transparency in the healthcare sector which works on e-government for procurement of health commodities and services to be open to the citizen by putting health services on advertisement board has contributed to reducing corruption in few successes. In particular, leaving the industry with susceptible to corruption in terms of embezzlement and cheating (forgery)⁶.

The service of writing on paper rather than online service to the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) sheets provide an opportunity for a group of actors such as agent (medical doctors, and external medical store owners) and principal (head of hospitals) to play corrupt practice which is in the line of collective action theory. According to collective action theory, corruption occurs when a group of actors believe that other actors act on dishonest sides and motivate corruption to be expected behaviour (Persson et al., 2013). The existing evidence indicates that an agent (medical doctors) forgery NHIF sheet by writing a false overpayment bill and present to another agent (external medical store owner (is regarded as an agent because of having information on how cheating of NHIF sheet work)) for payment execution in collaboration with the principal who involves in this corrupt game to gain unlawful money⁷.

In addition, the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) report of 2019/2020 indicated that National Health Insurance Funds (NHIF) rejected totalling of TZS 3.13 billion being subjected to overcharging of the service above the NHIF prices, double charging of the prescribed items, and insufficient patient's details made by the agents and principals (CAG Report 2019/2020, 2021). This report was only reported from three hospitals and two major academic institutions.

However, greed that led to short-term benefits and lack of working discipline resulted from the weak enforcement of legal framework led the agent (healthcare personnel and external medical store owners) to keep playing the corrupt acts in secret out of transparency which is in according to collective action theory that posits that group of actors are endowed with corrupt behaviour. For example, one of the informants from NGOs explained that grand corruption is about greed found in public officials with higher authority.

⁶ <https://www.pccb.go.tz/images/stories/joomlart/UCHUNGUZI/PRESS.pdf>

⁷ <https://www.ippmedia.com/sw/habari/waziri-abaini-upigaji-milioni-520-za-nhif>

.... you know grand corruption is highly concerned with public officials having the higher rank of authority who decide on behalf of others in the public institutions...these officials involved in corrupt behaviours because of greed, a personal gain which is associated with the low salary, low allowances and need to be rich in a short time. (NGO Informant).

In this regard, transparency that is expected to control the embezzlement of healthcare commodities available in the medical store fails to produce desired prevention results (Rashidian et al., 2012).

Also, the other factor that challenges transparency in reducing corruption is the little ability to punish corrupt behaviour inherited from top principals (decision-makers) who engage in a corrupt practice that infects other healthcare personnel to play it by stealing medical from the store (Sforza et al., 2020; Vian et al., 2012). This argument is in line with collective action theory, which asserts that a group of actors (decision-makers) lack trust in controlling corrupt crime performed by their subordinates because they are also involved in corruption practice (Persson et al., 2013). The informant interviewed from NGOs revealed that corruption is a mutation that moves from one person to another.

... corruption behaviour is a mutation; people keep changing in a short time like a chameleon for a specific time. For example, when you visit a hospital for healthcare services, you might be told different costs from different healthcare personnel.. (NGO Informant).

For example, the medical store department (MSD) report in Tanzania revealed a loss of TZS 500 billion of a drug shortage in 2016, limiting the agency's ability to meet the country demand for medicines supply (Mamdani et al., 2018). Also, the healthcare minister suspended four MSD directors for alleged misuse of Tzs 1.5 billion. However, it has been found that corruption is rampant in the healthcare sector because of poor coordination among different actors and inadequate transparency mechanisms to control the habit of stealing medicines and misusing public funds (*ibid*).

Therefore, the presence of agents (public officials) who conduct the unlawful practice of corrupt behaviour can be translated that corruption is expected behaviour that keeps moving from one person to another. That is to say, if the high-rank officials involve in corruption practice, then the behaviour will be conduct by low subordinates on the ground of grand

corruption. However, all of these practices limit the capacity for healthcare to deliver quality service to the public.

8.3.2 Awareness-raising

This body of research found that awareness-raising in the healthcare sector has been well increased to healthcare personnel, suppliers and private medical store owners. But despite the increase in educating the community on corruption risk, there is a decrease in reporting mechanisms caused by fearing to lose working position (Batory, 2012). It is not easy for a person to report corrupt behaviour made by a supervisor who appointed them to control grand corruption in medical stores. The informant from NGOs bears the argument that corrupt activities being made by the supervisor create a room of fear for a subordinate to report it to the respective body. This is also in the line of collective action theory which argues that those actors involved to prevent corruption are the ones who engage and benefit in corrupt behaviours (Persson et al., 2013).

...it is not easy that this procedure has managed to control corruption in the healthcare sector since their supervisor appoints healthcare personnel who work to inspect and maintain medical facilities. It is hard for them to reveal their supervisor when they are involved in corrupt acts... they can not do so because of fear of losing their working position (NGO Informant).

This argument was revealed in a study to understand why anti corruption fails in limiting systematic corruption, which arrived at the assumption that it is not easy for the actors to bite the hand that feeds them (Persson et al., 2013). This influence actors not to report corruption allegations because they will be no longer get money for their living.

8.3.3 Oversight

The interviews and document analysis reveals that oversight faces a challenge of little punishment for a confirmed corrupt crime. Both interviews and documents show that corrupt crime being charged to a corrupt person is at a low level of a penalty compared to the cost caused. However, low penalty charges that do not reflect the crime committed continue embarrassing corrupt behaviour in which a corrupt person continues doing it while knows that even if caught, there will be a low penalty to pay as compared to the cost he has caused. In this regard, it continues to be prevalent in people's minds as a normative behaviour because the audit is made, the investigation is made, and the court confirms beyond reasonable doubt that a suspected individual has committed a corruption case. Then judging provided is at a low level

of comparison to the wrongdoing made. For example, according to the PCCB report of 2017/2018 (2019), one individual was alleged to commit corruption that cost TZS 9.3 million and charged to pay a fine of TZS 500,000.00.

...however, the legal system is not fair since people are caught by the court with a corruption case and being judged to pay a fine which is less than the cost of a corruption case... for sure; this discourages reporting mechanism influence corruption habit and also depress auditing made...(NGO Informant).

The other factor associated with corruption in oversight is the Poor implementation of the auditor's recommendation due to weak capacity and weak law enforcement. According to collective action theory, corruption can be mitigated when a broad-based transparency requirement is greatly increasing monitoring mechanisms and strengthening sanctions on those engaging in corrupt practices (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; Persson et al., 2013). The recommendations advised by auditors rely on preventing corruption by obeying the law, honestly using transparency, stopping carelessness and laziness at the workplace and strengthening the legal framework. The recommendation also explains the cost effect caused by corrupt practices that harm institutions ability to provide healthcare service on time and even become short of stock to supply medicine and medical devices for the case of MSD (CAG report 2019/2020, 2021; Mikongoti et al., 2018).

...most CAG recommendations are not implemented in our country, ... if this could full be implemented, we could have already been at a higher level of controlling corruption...(NGO Informant).

Therefore, incomparable crimes against corruption cost and low level of implementing auditor's recommendation are interpreted as a factor that extending corrupt acts in society. However, a way to prevent corruption based on this factor is to strengthen the law's implementation that provides punishment as a penalty for those who have not implemented auditor recommendations without sound reasonable.

8.4.0 Discussions

8.4.1. Similarities

The research finding in this study indicates that both the healthcare and mining sectors use transparency, public awareness, and oversight to reduce corruption. The use of transparency in

both sectors, as seen in the procurement of medicals equipment, medicines, and application of mining licence permits to be made online. The research result presents that an integrative measure to provide services online helps to reduce corruption by minimising the distance between the service provider and receiver. Public awareness is possibly applied in both sectors by educating workers and actors integrating with these sectors on corruption risks and platforms for reporting corruption allegations. The findings suggest that awareness-raising helps the principals take the necessary action to report corruption allegations, refuse to pay corruption, and monitor agents on corruption acts. And the oversight is exercised in both sectors through auditing made to detect corruption allegations by publishing a report to be known to the public.

Also, research detected that these measures have had some impact on reducing grand corruption to both sectors through the effective implementation of auditing. The auditing made helped to detect corruption and suggested recommendations on how to prevent and reduce corruption.

The other similarity is on publication of the audited report. Both sectors publish an audited report to the public on their website. The published report made open to citizens provides a greater opportunity for the public to read and get informed of the detected corruption allegation. The publication of the audited report to the public is crucial in addressing civic engagement in helping to control corruption since it gives the public a participatory opportunity to discuss the report and advise a way forward.

8.4.2 Differences

The use of legal implementation is different in the two sectors. The study found that the performance of the Mining Act of 2010, Natural Wealth and Resource Contracts (Review and Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017 and the TEITA Act 2015 have improved to work well in the mining sector. This is because there is regular follow up on the implementation of the Acts guiding mining operation. There are several inspections of mines in the ground, produced and taken to the market, being conducted by the mining commission (MC). Follow up of payment as revenue is also made by Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (TEITI) through an independent organization. Also, there are an increase in the control mechanism of mines produced reporting from large- and small-scale producers. Furthermore, the application for licence permit is conducted online, which help to control probability for licence applicant to meet with the technical committee responsible for issuance of permit licence.

In contrast to the healthcare sector, the research findings noted that the implementation of the health policy of 2017 has not yet worked well to control and reduce corruption in the sector. The healthcare sector has managed to control corruption based on procurement being made online, reduce the distance to meet with suppliers, and centralise medical suppliers to be MSD. Also, the implementation of inspecting medicines and medical equipment is conducted through several national, regional, and district levels to control the stealing of medicines. Yet medicines available in the stock are nonetheless being stolen by pharmacists. This might probably be done because most medical stores in public health facilities lack cameral installation, which can help control the movement of in and out of medicines and enhance the reduction of corrupt behaviour. There is also forgery of NHIF sheet made by health personnel in collaboration with external medical owners and corrupt behaviour detected at MSD for government officials involved in this unethical behaviour.

How are agent personnel (health personnel in corroboration with external medical owners) and principal (head of hospital management) involved in corrupt behaviour that dwells in collective action theory? They involve because corruption is experienced and expected behaviour in which every actor is expected to act on the dishonest side. For example, health personnel (medical doctors, nurses and pharmacists) and external medical owners are regarded as agents, and heads of hospital management are considered principals who play a game of corruption by forgery government NHIF documents to get unlawful money. The agent who has access to information for NHIF sheets writes on the NHIF sheet false overbilling payment and takes it to the other agent (medical store owner) for executing payment implementation.

The other reason is fearing losing their work position, and they won't report despite the expanded reporting mechanism such as PCCB App. Corruption is being exercised by both the health personnel in the corporation with top medical personnel and external medical store owners. The healthcare workers receive instruction from their subordinates to play a corrupt game by writing false information on NHIF sheets and sending them to medical store owners to get unlawful money.

Moreover, the weak legal system results in greed, leading to the rapidly gaining of unlawful money to a pharmacist and medical store owner. As collective action theories argue that greed enhances corrupt behaviour to prevail in a group of actors, it creates an expansion of corrupt acts among players. The study found that people at work want to have a good life immediately,

such as buying a good luxury car, house, and running a good business in a short period, which pushes them to be involved in corrupt behaviour.

The other difference is on punishment implementation. The Mining Commission and Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives have the legal power to punish investors and public officials involved in corrupt behaviour. For example, investors interested in unethical behaviour are punished by fines, ceasing their license and even taken to court. For public officials are also taken to the disciplinary committee or the court for further action. The relationship between the principal (Public official) and agent (investor) is built on believing that the principal can help the agent to receive service based on favouritism in the line of principal-agent theory. When the agent is caught and fined to pay the fine, the agent requests the principal not to record the fine on the control number (electronic payment system) by giving them desirable corrupt money for him to be safe. Sometimes the agent requests relief of the payment of the fine to be little from the level of a mistake committed. This is done at a low level since several inspections are being conducted to detect corruption and several officials fear engaging in corrupt acts.

Contrary to the healthcare sector, the implementation of legal penalty work on the disciplinary committee and at the court, but no fine is provided to the agent who committed the corrupt crime on the spot. The court offers punishment once it has approved that the agent has committed the corrupt crime and is entitled to the punishment charges. Interestingly, punishment offered from the court is sometimes little compare to the cost caused. This problem continues to keep people engaging in corrupt behaviour.

Also, there is a difference in publishing an audited report to the public in these two sectors. In the mining sector, the audited report is directly published by TEITI and Mining Commission on their website after confirmed that the report is correct for publication.

In contrast to the healthcare sector, an audited report is published by the Controller and Auditor General on the website. The report is also presented to the president and taken to the parliament for further debate (CAG Report, 2020). Members of parliament advise the government on what should be done on corruption detected from the audited report in the healthcare sector (Diganyeck, 2018).

9. Conclusion and Recommendations

The thesis presents a comparative study examining the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures to mitigate corruption in mining and healthcare to explain why anti-corruption measures succeed in one sector and fall short in another. The mitigation of corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors depends on anti-corruption measures' effectiveness to prevent and fight corruption in two sectors. Existing literature review points out that transparency might effectively reduce corruption in the mining sector when legal reforms propagate on the openness of information, mainly revenue obtained from mining production to the public. In the healthcare sector, transparency may reduce corruption when there is active usage of e-procurement of health commodities which help to reduce personal discretion. Public awareness can reduce corruption when the campaign for corruption education is raised in the community and help the society to refuse to pay corruption and report the corrupt allegation to the anti-corruption body for punishment. Oversight may help reduce corruption in the environment of auditing government institutions and remind employees to follow organization rules, and if they breach such company policy, they may be punished. Additionally, auditing help to detect corruption incidences through auditors' observation ability and publish to the public.

The analysis and results provide an interesting finding that transparency reduce corruption when there are institutional measures to fight corruption in the mining sectors. These institutional measures are publishing an open reconciliation report to the public to interrogate it, an open template for extractive companies to fill with the actual revenue paid to the government and an online mining application that distance between applicant and review team from the mining commission. While in the healthcare sector, transparency works online to procure health commodities and place health services and cost on the advertisement board. Mechanism to control corruption in the healthcare sector is still weak because there are forged practices on NHIF sheets and medicine theft in health facilities.

Public awareness is effectively working to mitigate corruption due to a broader effort to educate the community on the adverse risk of corruption, reporting corruption allegations and bear witness at the court. As a result, there are decreases in reporting grand corruption in the mining sector due to larger knowledge of corruption in society.

However, auditing work on effective follow up of mining inspections for mines in-ground, produced, and taken to market, an active inspection of what extractive companies is obliged to

pay as revenue to the government and confirmation of receipt of revenue from the government. The auditing in the mining sector involves inspection teams from different institutions appointed in secret who conduct inspection open and increase the probability of not engaging in corrupt activities. In the healthcare sector, auditing is done by auditors and health teams appointed from the ministry of health, regional and district level to inspect trends of corruption in this sector. Auditing in the healthcare sector helps us know corruption allegations detected, especially forgery of NHIF documents and steal of medicine available in medical store premises, which is a prevalent problem within the sector that needs to be solved as soon as possible.

The thesis presented the methodology of collecting data through interview and document analysis, which had challenges in gathering data. For example, meeting with interviewees was a challenge due to the covid-19 pandemic. Getting an appointment for an interview took a long time with a response from the institution planned to meet for an interview, and sometimes I lacked the funds to move around to meet with interviewees. Also, interpreting data was complex since it required to compare data in both sectors differently, but some of the anti-corruption measures like public awareness look to work in both sectors with slight minor differences. Additionally, the thesis reflects that the outcome of reducing corruption depends on the reformation of the legal framework and effective implementation of legal reforms done by principals in an honest way through online services. However, I suggest the avenue for future research to explore an in-depth study on what can work better in implementing a legal framework in two sectors. Also, an effective way of alleviating forgery corruption of NHIF government documents and the essence of detective surveillance camera installation at all health premises, including the medical store, to mitigate corruption in the healthcare sector.

The theories in Tanzania's two cases help us to understand that corruption can be reduced when the principal has a strong ability to control agents from engaging in corrupt activities vested from strong implemented laws. Also, one of the differences in mining and healthcare is that there are larger number of actors involved in healthcare than in mining, and they are spread all over the country. This might be the reason that makes it more difficult to control corruption make it harder to monitor, detect and punish in healthcare than in mining.

Finally, I recommend that all NHIF sheets be made online for private and public health facilities all over the country. This would help to reduce corruption on the ground of forgery and writing

false information for the purpose of getting unlawful monies. Also, installing a camera at all health premises would enhance the camera to detect the stealing of medical from the public medical store and promote the reduction of corruption in the healthcare sector.

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Footnote

¹ <https://www.pccb.go.tz/index.php/en/kuhusu-sisi/historia-ya-takukuru>

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